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1 Introduction 
In this paper we explore a recent global phenomenon; the surge of investment in ‘second homes’ 
– properties that are not used as primary residence – and the subsequent political backlash
against wealthy investors in such properties. To identify the local housing and labor market 
impacts of constraining second home investments, we exploit a unique quasi-natural 
experiment in Switzerland – the ‘Second Home Initiative’ (SHI) that was narrowly approved 
by voters in March 2012 and effectively banned the construction of new second homes in 
touristic areas with a high share of such homes. Our findings imply that the adverse labor market 
effects dominated any anticipated positive landscape preservation effects. In fact, we do not 
observe any significant positive sorting response from residents to the alleged benefits of the 
ban. Our preferred estimates suggest that the ban lowered price growth of primary homes in 
affected areas by around 15%, increased price growth of second homes by about 26%, and 
increased the growth in local unemployment rates by around 12%.  
Fueled by low interest rates and a staggering wealth accumulation among a growing cohort of 
‘top earners’, over the last two decades countries such as the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, France, China, or Singapore have seen a dramatic increase in wealthy individuals 
investing in second homes. Within these countries, major cities – such as New York or London 
– and popular tourist regions observed the most pronounced booms.
In the United States the number of second homes increased by about 20% to 6.8 million between 
1995 and 2005 alone (Belsky et al., 2007). In Canada, according to estimates derived from the 
Survey of Financial Security, the number of second homes increased even slightly more during 
the same time period; by about 22% to 1.1 million. In the United Kingdom, according to the 
English Housing Survey, the number of second homes more than doubled between 1995 and 
2013. The rise of the market for second homes is perhaps most dramatic in China. In 2002, 
6.6% of all urban households owned a second home. By 2007, this share surged to 15% (Huang 
and Yi, 2011). Finally, in France, according to the French National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies, INSEE, by 2014, second homes represented 9.3% of the total housing stock.  
The surge in second home investments has triggered a serious political backlash in many 
countries, reflecting a diverse array of concerns.1 Critically, wealthy second home investors – 
especially foreign ones – are being blamed for the dramatic house price increases in many 
desirable high-amenity locations – tourist places as well as superstar cities. 2 Antipathy to new 
second home investors may also reflect “an ugly dislike of outsiders” or in some cases even 
“NIMBYism of second home investors themselves, keen to preserve the exclusiveness of their 
1 We provide newspaper references documenting second home policies implemented across the globe in Web-
Appendix A.   
2 While house prices in desirable tourist locations and superstar cities tend to increase strongly in the long-run due 
to a combination of strong demand and tight supply constraints (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016), resentment can turn 
into support in places that are confronted with severe house price busts. A case in point is Spain’s Golden Visa 
program, introduced in 2013, after the collapse of its real estate market. The intention of the program has been to 
stimulate the housing market by attracting property investment into Spain through facilitating a path towards 
residency. 
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holiday patch” (The Economist, 2016). This antipathy may be further reinforced by a growing 
number of wealthy at the top end and rising wealth inequality (Rognlie, 2014) in conjunction 
with envy motives. Other concerns relate more directly to the impact of owners of second homes 
in the affected localities: The uncontrolled construction of second homes may blight the 
beautiful landscape in touristic areas. Moreover, second homes typically stay empty for much 
of the year, creating a ghost town atmosphere outside tourist seasons, yet often generating little 
or no local tax revenue.  
One example of political backlash is New York City. In 2012, the city abolished a 20% tax-
abatement for owners of condos that were not primary residences. More recently, the Fiscal 
Policy Institute proposed a steep property tax surcharge on expensive pied-à-terre residences. 
In a similar vein, too curb soaring housing prices, Vancouver introduced a transaction tax of 
15% on purchases made by not permanent residents in 2016. The government of Ontario 
adopted a similar tax in 2017 for transactions occurring in the Greater Golden Horseshoe region, 
a high-amenity area particularly popular among foreign real estate investors.   
The political backlash has arguably been even more pronounced in Europe, in certain Asian 
countries, and in Australia. For example, in 2016 the UK introduced a 3% ‘stamp duty’ (transfer 
tax) hike on second homes. Popular tourist destinations located on the South West coast of the 
country – such as St. Ives or Carbis Bay – went a step further and adopted complete bans on 
second homes to limit the investors’ footprint.3 In France, the national government approved a 
law in 2014, allowing municipalities with overheating housing markets to introduce a property 
tax on second homes of up to 20%.4  
The Chinese government announced a whole series of measures to curb second home 
investments. These include drastic minimum requirements on down-payments in the entire 
country (although recently somewhat relaxed) and even more drastic measures in certain cities 
such as Beijing, where single-person households were banned from buying more than one 
residence and where a 20% capital gains tax on property was imposed. In a similar vein, 
Singapore’s government introduced several measures between 2010 and 2015 including an 
additional stamp duty tax and increased compulsory down-payments to discourage second 
home investments. Lastly, in Australia, a review board ensures that the purchase of existing 
properties by foreign investors benefits local communities. It precludes purchases by foreign 
buyers for investment motives (buy-to-let or expected capital gains) or for recreational use.  
To date we know little about the consequences of these policies and, in particular, we lack 
evidence on the impact of restrictions on the construction or ownership of second homes (vis-
à-vis instruments that tax non-primary residences). 
3 Denmark has a similar policy. Municipalities grant building permits for summer cottages only if projects meet 
stringent planning requirements – mainly intended to preserve the coastline. These restrictions were imposed 
mainly to prevent an inflow of (foreign) investors.  
4 In a similar vein, Israel introduced a property tax increase on second homes in 2015 with the intent to fight so 
called ‘phantom apartments’. 
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In our empirical analysis, we exploit a unique quasi-natural experiment – the SHI – to explore 
the impact of a constraint on the construction of new second homes in high-amenity places. The 
SHI stipulates that in municipalities with a share of second homes of 20% or more, investors 
are not allowed to plan and build any new second homes going forward, though primary 
residences built prior to 2013 can still be converted into second homes. Fiscal authorities in 
Switzerland legally categorize all housing units as either ‘primary’ or ‘second’ homes 
depending on whether or not a household uses a housing unit as primary residence.5 There is 
certainty about whether a unit is a primary residence because households only pay local income 
taxes in their primary place of residence (i.e., in the place where they live more than half of the 
year).6  
We faced two main challenges. The first is of a theoretical nature: to understand the mechanisms 
through which a constraint on second homes may affect local housing and labor markets, and, 
the residential location choices of primary residents and investors.  
To shed light on these mechanisms and resulting outcomes, we develop a simple dynamic 
general equilibrium framework and consider two contrary settings. The first assumes that 
primary and second homes effectively trade in separate markets (i.e., are poor substitutes). We 
assume nevertheless that the two housing markets are linked via labor markets. A growing 
number of wealthy second home investors positively affects local economies, driving up local 
wages, and thus demand for primary housing. However, second home investments are also 
assumed to adversely influence the primary residents’ valuation of local amenities, negatively 
affecting local housing demand. Our model yields two main propositions. Proposition 1 states 
that constraining second home investments (i) negatively impacts the housing market of 
primary residences (lowering the price growth of primary homes), (ii) adversely affects local 
labor markets (lowering wage growth – or in a setting with sticky wages; increasing the 
unemployment growth rate), and (iii) creates an ambiguous sorting reaction depending on how 
much local residents dislike second home investors. Proposition 2 asserts that the ban positively 
affects the equilibrium price growth of second homes.  
The second setting, in contrast, assumes that primary and second homes are perfect substitutes 
and consequently trade in the same market. In this case, the price of existing primary and second 
homes must move in the same direction. Whether this direction is positive or negative is 
theoretically ambiguous.  
Our empirical findings are consistent with the former setting, suggesting that – consistent with 
our priors – in Swiss tourist areas primary and second homes are poor substitutes.  
5 The second home status does not depend on the tenure (owner-occupied vs. renter-occupied) of the unit. 
Developers can still build rental properties – sometimes labelled ‘investment properties’ – post 2012 but, crucially, 
renter-occupiers must live in these new units permanently, not just during the tourist season. 
6 Cantonal inspectors can monitor an occupier’s presence in a second home. They can also conduct surprise visits 
for control purposes if they suspect misconduct. In a similar vein, in Israel authorities check the water usage of 
properties to determine whether an occupier may falsely claim to use a property as second home. 
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The second main challenge is the unbiased estimation of treatment effects. Although the 
treatment assignment variable – which is a deterministic function of second home rates – is pre-
determined in the standard difference-in-differences setting, it may correlate with unobserved 
time-invariant variables at the municipality level. More specifically, our control municipalities 
typically belong to major urban/suburban areas, whereas treated municipalities are usually 
located in mountainous touristic places. As such, the estimated impacts of the SHI on (pre and 
post ban) outcomes may potentially capture unobservable differences between treatment and 
control group.  
An additional source of endogeneity comes from the practical implementation of the SHI. 
Municipalities were allowed to challenge the official second home rate, which was used to 
determine the applicability of the SHI, and ask for a downward revision. Municipalities that 
were allowed to revise their second home rate downward were not subject to the ban imposed 
by the SHI. This might lead to out-of-treatment selection bias, as municipalities might have 
decided to challenge their second home rate according to economic incentives that correlate 
with unobserved outcome dynamics.  
A last source of endogeneity arises from unobserved dynamics, which likely differ between 
treated and control municipalities.  
To counter these potential sources of endogeneity, we employ three different strategies. First, 
to partial out time-invariant unobservables we estimate a first-difference model.  
Second, to address potential out-of-treatment selection bias, we instrument the observed 
treatment dummy – which is a function of second home rates as defined in 2012 but after 
revisions were taken into account – with the second home rates as measured by the 2000 Federal 
Population Census. The instrument strongly correlates with the observed treatment (measured 
in 2012), solving potential endogeneity issues linked to out-of-treatment selection.  
Third, to address the concern that “historic” second home rates may reflect permanent 
differences in unobserved outcome dynamics between treatment and control group (i.e., the 
instrument exogeneity may be questionable), we restrict the sample of municipalities such that 
their observed covariates are balanced, and then instrument the observed treatment dummy with 
second home rates in 2000. We use two alternative sample restrictions. The first sample 
restriction drops all municipalities located within a distance of 10 km from the boundary of one 
of the 15 major Swiss CBDs, and/or adjacent to a municipality containing one of the 53 major 
Swiss ski resorts. The second sample restriction follows Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) and 
is akin to a fuzzy regression discontinuity design: We drop municipalities located within a 
distance of 10 km from major CBDs and having a second home rate outside the narrow interval 
[0.15, 0.3]. Both sample restrictions allow us to focus on “similar” municipalities by way of 
excluding most major urban areas and highly touristic municipalities. Reassuringly, the 
estimated effects are robust to this check. 
Our paper relates to a relatively small but growing recent literature that focuses on the role 
played by residential real estate investors in housing markets. To begin with, Haughwout et al. 
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(2014) investigate the role of investors in the recent U.S. housing crisis. Three main findings 
arise from their analysis. First, investors are overrepresented in states that display the strongest 
boom-bust cycles. Second, investors misreporting their occupancy status to obtain better credit 
conditions had the tendency to bid more aggressively during the boom than owner-occupiers 
and admitted investors. Third, investors defaulted at a higher rate during the bust phase than 
owner-occupiers.  
Chinco and Mayer (2016) compare local second home buyers to out-of-town investors. They 
find that out-of-town buyers – unlike local second home buyers – behave as misinformed 
speculators, increasing future house prices and the implied-to-actual rent ratio. They develop 
an estimation strategy taking into account the possible reverse causality between housing prices 
and the out-of-town demand of investors. In a related paper, Bayer et al. (2015) classify 
investors into two categories according to their observed investment strategies: middlemen and 
speculators. The former group aims to make profit by buying from motivated sellers at prices 
below the market value and re-selling quickly, whereas the latter group times their investments 
to markets displaying strong price increases. By excluding the possibility that speculators 
possess superior information on housing price dynamics, they indirectly establish a causal link 
between speculative behavior and housing price bubbles.  
Four recent papers focus on international second home investments in major world cities. 
Cvijanovic and Spaenjers (2015) explore the effect of international demand for luxury 
secondary residences in Paris. They point out how investors concentrate in specific areas, 
increasing local housing prices. In line with Chinco and Mayer (2016), they find that foreign 
investors realize lower capital gains compared to local ones. Badarinza and Ramadorai (2016) 
focus on London and document how foreign real estate investors possess a “home bias abroad”. 
They invest in areas displaying high shares of residents of the same country thus affecting 
housing prices and transaction volumes.7 Suher (2016) explores the response of non-resident 
owners of second homes in New York City to targeted annual property taxes. Using the city’s 
2013 change in the property tax treatment of condominiums, he documents that non-resident 
buyers have a significant impact on house prices within a subset of highly desirable 
neighborhoods, but no impact outside of these areas. Finally, Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh 
(2017) develop and calibrate a spatial equilibrium model for the New York and Vancouver 
metro areas to investigate the welfare effects of out-of-town home buyers. Their findings 
suggest that higher levels of out-of-town buyers are associated with higher house prices and 
lower welfare. However, taxing purchases made by foreign investors can lead to welfare gains 
to the extent fiscal revenues are used to finance local public goods.  
Overall, the literature appears to support the widespread concern that non-resident investors 
into residential real estate increase local house prices and fuel market instability. This gives 
potential legitimacy to policies that aim to constrain non-resident real estate investments either 
7 In a similar vein, Sá (2016) finds that the volume share of residential real estate investments in England and 
Wales performed by overseas companies increases house prices and decreases homeownership rates. 
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by imposing higher local taxes on non-primary owners or by constraining the quantity of such 
investments. To date, however, we know little about the economic effects of such investment 
constraints on local housing and labor market outcomes, and on the location decisions of 
primary residents. This paper aims to fill this gap. In particular, our analysis considers mid- and 
long-term investors and does not exclusively focus on short-term speculators. The latter do not 
fully capture the significance of the global second home investment phenomenon. The presence 
of short-term, often inexperienced, speculators may only be one of the ultimate symptoms 
associated with overheating local housing markets.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional setting 
and the specifics of the SHI. In section 3 we present a simple dynamic general equilibrium 
model and derive predictions for the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the data and 
provides descriptive statistics. We outline our empirical setup in Section 5 and present the main 
results and robustness checks in Section 6. The final section concludes. 
2 Institutional background and the Second Home Initiative (SHI) 
Popular initiatives are an instrument of direct democracy that allows Swiss citizens to modify 
the country’s constitution. Supporters of an initiative are required to collect 100’000 valid 
signatures in favor of the initiative within 18 months. In order to avoid undue influence of 
populous regions (in Switzerland called ‘cantons’ and ‘half-cantons’), the initiative must be 
approved by the majority of voters and cantons. Popular initiatives have a low approval rate: 
up to April 2015 only 22 out of 198 initiatives obtained dual majority. This is for two reasons. 
First, popular initiatives are often considered extreme and meant to send a signal to policy 
makers rather than being intended to actually modify the constitution. Second, authorities are 
allowed to formulate a more moderate counter-proposal, often leading proponents to withdraw 
the initiative.  
Supporters of the SHI collected enough validated signatures by January 2008. The Federal 
Council, the Parliament, most of the political parties and economic organizations recommended 
to vote against the initiative. Thus it came as a surprise when in March 2012 Swiss voters 
approved the SHI with the narrowest of margins; 50.6% of the votes and 13.5 (12 cantons and 
3 half-cantons) of the 26 cantons (23 cantons and 6 half-cantons). Although voting polls 
suggested that a tight majority in favor of the initiative is feasible, its approval by the majority 
of cantons was a complete bolt from the blue.  
On January 1st, 2013 the SHI ordinance came into force, banning construction of new second 
homes in municipalities where such homes represented 20% or more of the total housing stock. 
Two elements of the ordinance are particularly relevant for our analysis. First, second homes 
that had obtained a construction permit prior to the vote were still allowed to be built after the 
ordinance came into force. This prevented the number of newly built second homes above the 
threshold to fall to zero in the years just after the approval of the initiative. Second, primary 
homes built – or possessing a construction permit issued – before the ordinance came into force 
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(i.e., before 2013) may still be converted into second homes, but those planned and built after 
the ordinance was enacted lost their conversion option.8  
Both elements of the ordinance were defined after the approval of the initiative, thus they were 
unknown to the voters prior to August 2012. Although the wording of the initiative had to be 
introduced into the Swiss constitution, implementation-specifics (and conformity with existing 
laws) were open to debate. In fact, the final text of a popular initiative is usually an arm-wrestled 
compromise between politicians supporting the initiative and those representing lobbies’ 
interests. Therefore, the uncertainty concerning the specific implementation of the SHI made 
anticipation strategies extremely unlikely even after the voting results were known.  
Treated areas in our setting – mountainous and other areas near lakes with shares of second 
homes above 20% – typically possess local economies that are reliant on tourism. A majority 
of voters in these areas, on balance, benefit substantially from the second home industry, 
directly or indirectly. It is therefore no surprise that the majority of local residents – especially 
in municipalities with very high shares of second homes and high homeownership rates9 – were 
strongly opposed to the SHI. The strong positive correlation between the SHI-share of no votes 
and the share of second homes in a municipality is illustrated in Figure 1. The positive 
association between the voting outcome and the anticipated treatment status is also apparent at 
cantonal level. Figure 2 documents that in most cantons where a sizeable share of the population 
is likely affected by the ban, the initiative was rejected. 
In Appendix Table A1 (Appendix A) we go one step further and present the results of a simple 
voting analysis, controlling for confounding factors, and reporting separate findings for the full 
sample of municipalities, the control and the treatment group. Focusing on treated tourist areas 
first, we find that – consistent with our main results – permanent local residents in the affected 
areas weighed the adverse economic effects of the SHI much more strongly than the anticipated 
positive effects highlighted forcefully by the supporters of the initiative. The higher the share 
of second homes, the higher the homeownership rate, the closer a municipality to a major ski 
resort, and the higher the voter turnout, the more strongly permanent residents in treated areas 
were opposed to the SHI.  
Despite their strong opposition and turnout, however, voters in the treated areas did not succeed 
in preventing the approval of the SHI. This is because voters in populous and non-touristic 
control areas also had a say. A simple analysis of the voting behavior in these non-treated areas 
indicates that the overall support may have been mainly driven by envy motives of voters with 
8 Initially the ‘conversion option’ was confined to sales that did not trigger the construction of a new primary home 
in the treated or another nearby municipality. This measure intended to avoid speculative behavior of primary 
homeowners. However, the restriction was not included in the final law – implemented in January 2016 – because 
policy makers deemed it ineffective. This is allegedly for two reasons. First, mobile skilled individuals are likely 
to move over longer distances, so the restriction would not prevent them from moving away and pocketing the 
proceeds from the conversion option. Second, implementation (coordination across local jurisdictions) would have 
been very difficult and costly to monitor. 
9 Homeownership rates at the local level are available only from the decennial Census until 2000. Since 2010 the 
Federal Statistical Office only draws a sample of the population, not allowing us to explore the effect of the SHI 
on homeownership attainment in treated areas.  
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little wealth: the higher the share of renters and the lower the income in a non-treated 
municipality, the stronger was the support in favor of the SHI. Moreover, perhaps driven by an 
‘existence value’ associated with the preserved landscape, the further away voters lived from 
high amenity places, and therefore the higher the travel costs associated with a second home, 
the greater is the likelihood that they supported the SHI. 
3 The Model 
In this section, we present a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in the spirit of Rosen 
(1979) and Roback (1982). We build on recent work by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) who 
provide a general spatial equilibrium setting for the structural analysis of housing prices, wages, 
and population growth in the presence of agglomeration economies.10  
We consider a system of local jurisdictions that differ in the quality of major natural amenities, 
such as mountains or lakes, but an amenity could also be interpreted e.g. as the touristic or 
consumer center of a superstar city.11 High quality amenities attract second home investors and 
increase the production efficiency of firms that exploit these amenities, leading local economies 
to exclusively specialize in the tourism sector. Mobile workers choose their primary residence 
by sorting across local jurisdictions according to wages, housing prices, natural amenities, and 
the negative externalities caused by second home investors. Investors generate such 
externalities via adversely affecting the landscape and creating ghost towns.12 
One key assumption in our model is that primary and second homes trade in two distinct 
markets within each local jurisdiction, that is, the two markets have separate demand and supply 
functions. This implies that primary and second homes are poor substitutes. In section 3.6 we 
discuss the contrasting case of perfect substitutability along with predictions.  
The assumption of poor substitutability does not seem farfetched. It arises when second home 
investors and primary residents differ in their preferences for the micro-location within 
municipalities or for the layout of a property. For example, second home investors tend to have 
strong preferences for nice views onto mountaintops, lakes or cityscapes or for quick access to 
ski lifts. These micro-locations are typically scarce. Vice versa, primary residents tend to 
strongly value good access to employment opportunities, local schools or supermarkets. 
Moreover, the layout of permanent homes often differs starkly from that of second homes. 
Differences in preferences for micro-locations and layouts, within municipality heterogeneity 
in locational access to amenities and services, and differences in the layouts of properties may 
10 Our theoretical framework also relates to recent work by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), Hsieh and Moretti 
(2015), and Gaubert (2015).  
11 While the theoretical considerations are in large parts similar for highly touristic areas and large superstar cities, 
one important distinction is the fact that the latter have much more diversified labor markets and are less dependent 
on second home investors. Thus, the predictions for labor market effects may differ. We discuss this point and its 
policy implications in the concluding section. 
12 In our setting we do not model the likely negative effect of the ban on wages through the local construction 
industry. The negative wage effect in the construction industry is redundant with the negative wage impact of the 
ban on the tourism industry. In interest of parsimony, we model only this latter mechanism.   
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thus effectively create separate markets. Strong wealth differentials between well-off second 
home investors and less well-off primary residents may further reinforce this market separation. 
3.1 Tourism industry 
The local tourism industry produces non-tradable goods and services such as local ski lifts or 
restauration services that are sold to second home investors. We assume that residents in the 
municipality supply one unit of labor inelastically and we ignore cross-commuting, such that 
the number of local residents corresponds to local employment. Following Glaeser and Gottlieb 
(2009) and Hsieh and Moretti (2015), the output of firms is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function that displays decreasing returns to scale at the aggregate level:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛾?̅?𝑖
1−𝛽−𝛾
,      0 < 𝛽, 𝛾 < 1, 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖𝑡, and 𝐾𝑖𝑡 represent output, total factor productivity, employment, and traded 
capital in municipality 𝑖 at time 𝑡, respectively; ?̅?𝑖 represents the municipality fixed stock of 
non-traded capital (e.g. land) that makes returns to scale decreasing at the municipality level 
but constant for individual firms. The industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive and firms 
choose the level of the factors of production to maximize their profits. Traded capital is supplied 
with infinite elasticity at an exogenous price set equal to 1. Labor and capital first order 
conditions lead to the labor demand equation:  
𝑁𝑖𝑡 ∝ 𝐴𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑝𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾
. (2) 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 and 𝑊𝑖𝑡 denote, respectively, the price of tourism services and the wages paid by the 
local tourism industry. 
3.2 Local residents 
Local residents are perfectly mobile and equalize their indirect Cobb-Douglas utility function 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜂 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑎 ,  0 < 𝑎 < 1,  𝜃𝑖 > 0, 𝜂 < 0 (3) 
across municipalities, where the term 𝜃𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜂 denotes an endogenous amenity index that
decreases as the number of second home investors 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮  in the municipality increases. In our
context, the factor 𝜃𝑖 reflects either the exogenously given value of natural amenities or the 
quality of the social-life in the municipality. The value primary residents attach to this index 
evolves dynamically according to the negative externalities imposed by second home investors. 
The factor 𝜂 captures the extent to which local residents care about the disamenity caused by 
the presence of investors. The term 𝑟𝑖𝑡 represents the cost of local housing in the considered 
time period – i.e. the rental cost or the periodical cost of homeownership. The parameter 𝑎 is 
the constant expenditure share on housing.   
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3.3 Second home investors 
Second home investors sort across municipalities to maximize their indirect Cobb-Douglas 
utility, which we assume depends on the optimal consumption of natural amenities, tourism 
services, and housing:  
𝑉𝑡
𝒮 = 𝜃𝑖
𝒮𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜖 𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝑏 ,      0 < 𝑏 < 1,  𝜃𝑖
𝒮 > 0, 𝜖 ≤ 0, (4) 
where, similar to the case of primary residents, the amenity index 𝜃𝑖
𝒮𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜖 reflects the potential
dislike of an investor for the presence of other investors. (When 𝜖 is strictly negative, the 
endogenous amenity index could also be interpreted as congestion costs associated with the 
consumption of tourism services such as the use of ski lifts.) The terms 𝑊𝑡
𝒮 and 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝒮 represent,
respectively, the local second home market housing costs and the exogenous wages of second 
home investors that are determined outside our system of municipalities.13 The parameter 𝑏 is 
the constant expenditure share on housing of second home investors.  
3.4 Housing developers 
We describe the problem of developers of primary residences following Glaeser (2008). 
(Developers of second homes solve a similar optimization problem. See the right-hand side of 
the market clearing condition B5 in Appendix B.) Let us assume that in every municipality at 
an arbitrary point in time 𝑡0 < 𝑡 there is a fixed supply of housing units 𝐻𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡0
𝜌𝑖 – where 𝐻𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖 >
0 are parameters affecting the supply elasticity – that can be built at a unitary cost of 𝐶𝑖𝑡0 or
less and sold at the market price 𝑃𝑖𝑡0 . Prices and heterogeneous construction costs are assumed
to grow or shrink at steady state rates 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖
𝑐, respectively, prior to the ban. Both rates are
lower than the interest rate 𝑟. Profit maximizing developers choose the optimal period 𝑡 in 
which to develop and sell a property. The profit at 𝑡0 of developing a plot of land is given by 
the discounted value of the future property price 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔)
𝑡−𝑡0𝑃𝑖𝑡0 less the discounted value
of its future unit cost 𝐶𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝑔
𝑐)𝑡−𝑡0𝐶𝑖𝑡0:
max
𝑡
((1 + 𝑟)−(𝑡−𝑡0)((1 + 𝑔𝑖)
𝑡−𝑡0𝑃𝑖𝑡0  − (1 +  𝑔𝑖
𝑐)𝑡−𝑡0𝐶𝑖𝑡0)) ,   𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0. (5) 
Marginal development in period 𝑡 occurs when the optimal stopping rule – obtained by setting 
the derivative of the continuous version of (5) equal to zero – is satisfied. Waiting to develop 
after the period implied by the stopping rule decreases the profit function of developers, thus 
harming them.  
As we assume that primary (𝒫) and secondary (𝒮) residences are produced by two distinct 
supply functions, the housing supply of each type of residence is then given by 
13 The wage 𝑊𝑡
𝒮  can be thought of as the share of wage investors spend where their second home is located. This
is the case, for example, if second home investors – which consume composite goods and services 𝑐𝑖𝑡 and housing
𝐻𝑖𝑡  where their primary residence is located (location 𝑖) and touristic services 𝑐𝑙𝑡  and housing 𝐻𝑙𝑡  where they own
a second   home (location 𝑙) – have preferences according to a nested Cobb-Douglas function of the form 
𝑈𝒮(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑙𝑡) = (𝑢𝑖𝑡)
𝑠1(𝑢𝑙𝑡)
1−𝑠1  with  𝑢𝑘𝑡 = 𝜃𝑘𝑡(𝑐𝑘𝑡)
1−𝑠𝑘(𝐻𝑘𝑡)
𝑠𝑘 , 𝑘 = 𝑖, 𝑙. Then investors spend a constant share
(1 − 𝑠1) of their “total” wage 𝑊𝑡 in location 𝑙, i.e.  𝑊𝑡
𝒮 = (1 − 𝑠1)𝑊𝑡. 
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𝐻𝑖
𝑗 (
𝑟−𝑔𝑖
𝑗
(1+ 𝑔
𝑖
𝑗,𝑐
)
𝑡−𝑡0
(𝑟−𝑔
𝑖
𝑗,𝑐
) 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗)
𝜌𝑖
,    𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮}. (6) 
For ease of exposition, in what follows we only report the 𝒮 superscript to distinguish second 
homes from primary ones.  
We model a ban on second homes as the limiting case of an increase in the cost of producing 
such houses. By exogenously increasing  𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐 the second home supply becomes more inelastic.
If the increase in costs is large enough, the supply will become perfectly inelastic, which 
corresponds to a ban on second homes. Comparative static results based on the growth of 
construction costs of second homes thus correspond to those of a ban of such homes.  
3.5 Equilibrium outcomes 
Having stated the problem of firms in the tourism sector, primary residents, second home 
investors, and housing developers, we can solve for the equilibrium solution of the system. To 
link the endogenous stock price of primary and secondary residences to the value of their 
housing flows, we use the standard dynamic price equation: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 = ∑
𝑟𝑖𝑡+𝑙
𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝑙
=
1+𝑟
𝑟−𝑔
𝑖
𝑗
+∞
𝑙=0 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑗  , 𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮} , (7) 
where we assume that rents grow at a steady state rate 𝑔𝑖
𝑗
. We can now define the concept of
dynamic equilibrium: 
DEFINITION 1.  A dynamic equilibrium is a vector (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
,
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
,
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
,
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ,
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ,
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
)  such 
that for every municipality 𝑖 and every time period 𝑡: 
i) Local labor markets clear according to equation (2).
ii) Primary residents and second home investors equalize their indirect utilities across
municipalities according to equations (3) and (4), respectively.
iii) Housing markets of primary and secondary residences clear.
iv) The market of tourism services clears.
As the dynamic system of equations characterizing local economies can be linearized, we have 
COROLLARY 1. There exists a unique dynamic equilibrium. 
Proof. See Appendix B.  
We can use the dynamic equilibrium to make comparative static predictions about the impact 
of constraining second home investments (i.e. increase their construction costs) on the outcome 
variables of our model. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑡+1
0,𝑗
 and 𝑦𝑖𝑡+1
1,𝑗
 denote a given post-ban outcome variable if the ban
would not have been/is enacted, respectively. We can express the average treatment effect on 
the treated as 
𝐸(ln(𝑦𝑖𝑡+1
1,𝑗 ) − ln(𝑦𝑖𝑡+1
0,𝑗 ) |𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸 (ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡+1
1,𝑗
𝑦
𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ) − ln (
𝑦𝑖𝑡+1
0,𝑗
𝑦
𝑖𝑡
𝑗 ) |𝐷 = 1) ,    𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮}  (8) 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 denotes pre-ban outcomes and 𝐷 an observed treatment dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the municipality is subject to the ban and 0 otherwise. We obtain the following propositions for 
primary residents and second home investors, which we test in the empirical analysis below:
PROPOSITION 1. If primary and second homes are not substitutable, then constraining the 
construction of new second homes 
i) reduces the price growth of primary homes,
ii) reduces wage growth, and
iii) has an ambiguous effect on the growth of the local population. The sign depends
on the extent to which local residents dislike second home investors.
Proof. See Appendix B and Appendix Table B1. 
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, consider the effects of a constraint (or outright 
ban) on new second homes on the local landscape and the local economy. If local residents 
don’t care much about the disamenity caused by the presence of investors (𝜂 ≈ 0), the 
constraint hurts the local tourism industry without providing any benefit to primary residents, 
causing the growth in wages and the number of residents to be lower in the new equilibrium. 
This negatively impacts the aggregate housing demand for primary homes, leading to a negative 
equilibrium price effect.  
Now consider the other extreme where local residents care a lot about the negative externality 
imposed by investors (𝜂 ≪ 0). In this case, the predictions of Proposition 1 hinge on the 
decreasing returns to scale assumption, which would seem plausible for the local tourism 
industry. That is, the constraint can be expected to attract local residents into treated 
municipalities relative to the counterfactual (positive amenity affect). However, in a setting with 
decreasing returns to scale in the tourism industry, the constraint also reinforces the negative 
effect on local wage growth (deterring primary residents). In equilibrium, in our setting with 
decreasing returns to scale, the effect on local demand for primary homes and primary house 
prices is unambiguously negative, whereas the effect on the total number of primary residents 
is theoretically ambiguous. In Appendix B, we explore whether Proposition 1 still holds when 
we instead assume agglomeration economies (increasing returns to scale) in the local tourism 
industry. We demonstrate that if agglomeration forces become very strong and exceed a certain 
threshold, a constraint on new second homes may increase the price growth of primary homes 
and wages. However, simulations – documented in Web-Appendix B – suggest that such a 
threshold may be unrealistically high.     
PROPOSITION 2. If primary and second homes are not substitutable, the average price growth 
effect on second homes of constraining new second home investments is positive. 
Proof. See Appendix B and Appendix Table B1. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward: A constraint (or outright ban) on new 
second homes makes supply more price inelastic, thus capitalizing future demand growth of 
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second homes into comparatively higher equilibrium prices (and price growth). More inelastic 
supply also implies fewer second home investors and this in turn reduces demand for tourism 
services, lowering prices for such services. 
Propositions 1 and 2 also have distributional implications, allowing us to speculate about the 
impact of constraining second home investments on local residents and, more generally, wealth 
inequality. Proposition 1 implies that constraining second home investments imposes a 
significant economic cost on local homeowners in the form of both, lower house price and lower 
wage growth, making local homeowners unambiguously worse off.14 Since prices are measured 
as the present value of imputed rents, constraining second home investments is also expected 
to lower future rent levels. But this does not mean that renters are better-off. This is because the 
fall in rents is commensurate to a decrease local wages. In a spatial equilibrium setting without 
relocation costs, renters should be neither better nor worse off. Proposition 2 implies that 
existing second home investors in treated locations should be better off as their investments 
become more valuable. Overall, these predicted distributional effects imply an increase in 
wealth inequality as a consequence of constraining new second home investments, hurting local 
homeowners and favoring absentee second home investors. 
3.6 Equilibrium outcomes when primary and second homes are perfect substitutes 
In a setting where existing primary and second homes are perfect substitutes (both have a 
conversion option in both directions), the price of the two types must be the same and, by 
implication, the impact of the ban on the price must go in the same direction and must be of the 
same magnitude as well. Although the ban prevents the construction of new second homes, it 
does not prevent second home investors from entering the location. This is because existing 
primary residents have the valuable option to sell their property to second home investors and 
either move away or build a new – cheaper – primary home without conversion option at the 
outskirts of the location. Nevertheless, the expected growth rate of the number of second home 
investors should decrease post-ban. This is because eventually the municipality will run out of 
existing primary homes with a conversion option, at which point the ban puts an absolute upper 
limit on the number of second homes.  
In our setting, if the expected growth rate of the number of new second home investors 
decreases, this has a negative feedback effect on local residents via the local labor market. 
Aggregate demand for housing in the local jurisdiction decreases, yet, at the same time, supply 
of second homes (or primary homes with a conversion option respectively) becomes more 
inelastic at the point in time of the ban. The net impact of these two opposing effects on the 
equilibrium price growth of houses with a conversion option is theoretically ambiguous.  
14 We would not expect a negative effect of the ban on the price of primary homes in a setting with exogenously 
determined incomes. Consider a retirement community where retirees receive an exogenously determined pension 
income. Retirees will welcome the preservation effects of the ban on the local landscape, whereas local labor 
market considerations are, in the extreme, irrelevant. These considerations could explain the popularity of banning 
second homes in British sea resorts. 
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In contrast to the separate market case, primary homeowners retain a ‘conversion option’ to sell 
their property to second home investors post-ban. How valuable this option for existing owners 
is depends on their moving costs. In the extreme of ‘excessively high moving costs’ the option 
to convert is worthless. However, in reality the option may at least partially hedge primary 
homeowners against the adverse effects on the local economy. Put differently, ignoring moving 
costs, primary residents may not be worse off compared to existing second home investors. 
Interestingly, from a policy point of view, in a setting with perfect substitutability, banning 
second homes is likely to reinforce some of the key concerns it is supposed to tackle: The ban 
reduces the willingness-to-pay for housing of local residents due to the adverse effect on local 
wages. The ban thus creates incentives for primary homeowners to sell their properties to 
second home investors, whose willingness-to-pay has not changed post-ban. Some primary 
residents may sell and move away, which would mean that the share of second home investors 
relative to the total local population rises and the ‘ghost town’ problem worsens. Some primary 
residents may sell their homes in the most desirable micro-locations and purchase newly 
constructed primary dwellings that do not have a conversion option at the outskirts of the 
location, in effect creating a new separate market of ‘properties without a conversion option’ 
for primary residents. To the extent that existing primary homes are clustered mainly in the 
center of municipalities and new primary homes have to be built at the outskirts, this could 
reduce social cohesion and may even increase sprawl – because a ban on second homes does 
not prevent construction of primary homes at the outskirts. 
4 Data and descriptive statistics  
We combine housing data provided by the Swiss Real Estate Datapool Association (SRED) 
with municipality-level data from various sources discussed below. We provide more detail on 
the sources and data in Web-Appendix C.  
4.1 Data sources and variables 
Housing transaction data — The SRED collects and pools transaction data from various 
mortgage lenders – both private and cantonal banks. The SRED provided us data on individual 
transaction prices and corresponding housing characteristics for all of Switzerland and from 
2000q1 to 2015q1. For each housing unit, in addition to the transaction price, we know whether 
the buyer intends to use the unit as primary or secondary residence, the physical characteristics 
of the unit (number of rooms, number of bathrooms, number of parking places, micro-location 
quality, housing unit quality, housing condition, construction year, and an indicator for whether 
the unit is a single-family house or an apartment) and the unit’s location (municipal and 
cantonal identification codes).  
Unemployment and wage data — We use yearly data on unemployment at municipality level 
pre and post approval of the SHI provided by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO). Our measure of local unemployment is the number of unemployed individuals in a 
municipality divided by its total population. We use total population as denominator rather than 
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total employment, as the latter is not available at municipality level.15 As a consequence, our 
‘unemployment rate’ measure is lower than that published by official sources for more 
aggregate geographical levels. Average yearly wages of employees at the municipality level 
have been computed by merging the Population and Household Statistics of the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office (FSO) with social-security data provided by the Central Compensation Office 
(CCO).  
Elderly residents — The Federal Population Census provided by the FSO offers data on the 
age structure of the resident population at the municipality level from 2010. We use the number 
of local residents over 65 years – thus not working anymore according to the Swiss mandatory 
retirement age – as an outcome variable to measure the amenity effect. We use the number of 
elderly to measure the local amenity effect, as their sorting behavior should not be affected by 
labor-related decisions. If the SHI does indeed create a positive amenity effect, we would expect 
the number of elderly moving to a treated municipality to increase post ban.   
Second home rates — We obtained the municipality-level second home rate from the Swiss 
Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE). Using data from the Federal Register of 
Buildings and Dwellings of 2012, ARE computes the number of second homes per municipality 
as the total housing stock less the number of primary homes. Second home rates are thus fixed 
over the period of our analysis, although some municipalities – upon request –were allowed to 
revise their rates downwards. We use the second home rates after revisions were taken into 
account to compute the observed treatment dummy, which equals one if the municipality second 
home rate is greater or equal than 20%, and takes value zero if the municipality is below the 
20% threshold. Additionally, we use second home rates provided by the 2000 Federal 
Population Census as an instrument for second home rates in 2012.  
Fiscal data — Fiscal data at municipality level comes from the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration (FTA). In our analysis, we use the pre-policy municipality average net income 
after taxes, the municipality’s Gini index based on the same underlying income measure, and 
the predetermined share of foreign residents in the municipality represented by foreign 
individuals paying local taxes. We note that predetermined values of these variables reflect not 
only the fiscal status of the municipality, but may also capture a social amenity value: 
households may prefer to live in a municipality whose residents share a similar socio-economic 
background as their own. 
Other municipality characteristics (time-invariant or predetermined) — To proxy for local 
natural amenities, we use the time-invariant share of undevelopable land – including lakes, 
glaciers, and bedrock – provided by land use data sourced from the FSO. Geographical 
Information System (GIS) data on the boundaries of administrative units at national, cantonal, 
and municipal level comes from the Federal Office of Topography (Swisstopo). GIS data allows 
15 One might be concerned that the SHI affected our unemployment rate measure through total population rather 
than the number of unemployed individuals. However, the findings reported in Appendix Table A3 reveal that the 
second home ban did not have any meaningful effect – both in a statistical and economic sense – on the total 
(permanent) population. 
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us to compute the distance of each municipality from 15 major Swiss urban centers and 53 
major ski resorts. These two measures capture how households value the proximity to major 
labor markets and labor markets linked to the tourist industry in high natural amenity places, 
respectively. We collected data from the FSO on the number of workers and firms active in the 
service sector as measured in 2011 and on the number of newly constructed residences from 
2008 to 2011. This latter variable allows us to control for the predetermined importance of the 
residential real estate sector in the municipality. Finally, the FSO also provides data on the 
predetermined number of primary residents in the municipality. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of control and treated municipalities 
For the purpose of our regression analysis, we aggregate the data at municipality level and 
compute two-year averages for the pre-ban (2010-2011) and the post-ban (2013-2014) period. 
We consider an additional pre-period (2008-2009) to include lagged controls. Computing two-
year averages allows us to increase the number of transactions observed in a given municipality 
and to include a greater number of municipalities in our sample. In our less restrictive 
specifications we retain approximately 60% of all Swiss municipalities.16 We provide summary 
statistics in Tables 1A (control group) and 1B (treatment group) for the pre (2010-2011) and 
post (2013-2014) SHI approval periods.  
Because there was great uncertainty concerning the practical application of the initiative until 
August 2012, individuals may or may not have anticipated its effects during this year despite 
the ordinance not being in force, making its evaluation difficult. In our empirical analysis, we 
thus drop 2012 observations from our sample. Finally, in order to compare only primary homes 
that possess a conversion option before and after the SHI approval (i.e., to compare ‘like with 
like’), we drop primary residences built after 2012 from our sample.  
A comparison of Tables 1A and 1B reveals that the threshold imposed by the initiative 
essentially divides areas with major urban centers (control) from mountainous ones (treatment). 
Below the threshold, municipalities are nearer to major urban centers and more distant to major 
ski resorts, whereas the opposite is true for treated municipalities. Control municipalities thus 
have – on average – a larger population and higher salaries. Elderly prefer to live in 
municipalities belonging to the control group, likely due to a better access to healthcare 
services. The percentage of individuals and firms active in the service sector is similar for the 
two groups, suggesting that local economies in treated places mostly rely on tourism and that 
agriculture may only play a marginal role. Interestingly, we do not observe any marked 
difference in unemployment rates between treatment and control municipalities. Figure 3 
illustrates the geographic distribution of treated municipalities: most of them are situated in or 
near the Alps, further supporting our claim that for these municipalities the tourist industry is 
the main pillar of their local economies, consistent with our model. Given this proximity to the 
16 We excluded new municipalities that were created from mergers of existing municipalities during the post-ban 
period from our analysis.   
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Alps, treated municipalities have more natural amenities, as measured by the share of 
unproductive surface, compared to the control group.    
Treated municipalities have lower average house prices, both before and after the approval of 
the initiative. House prices are lower in treated municipalities in part because they are further 
from major urban areas, but in part also because of lower housing quality. However, whereas 
the control places have a positive price trend in the traded primary properties pre and post the 
SHI-approval, the price trend in the treated locations is reversed post implementation of the 
policy. In treated places, traded properties are older, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Interestingly, we observe an increase in this age differential after the SHI-approval: 
The average age of transacted properties in the control group remained stable. In the treatment 
group however it increased by more than four years. Similarly, the aggregate housing stock 
quality of traded properties in treated municipalities appears to have been adversely affected by 
the ban. 
Two remaining points are worth noting. First the threshold imposed by the SHI is situated at 
the tail of the second home rate distribution as depicted in Figure 4. This makes sample 
restrictions around the threshold – such as those implemented in a regression discontinuity 
design – extremely challenging. As expected, we do not observe any bunching of municipalities 
around the 20% threshold set by the initiative. The absence of bunching suggests that requesting 
a revision of the official second home rate in 2012 was the only way for municipalities to modify 
their treatment status. Second, as illustrated in Figure 5, the SHI did not noticeably affect the 
pattern of primary housing transactions with respect to second home rates: primary homes are 
mainly transacted in and nearby major urban centers, which typically possess second home 
rates between 10% and 15%. Similarly, very little of the second home demand from the above-
20%-municipalities appears to have shifted to control municipalities just below the 20% 
threshold. Consistent with this, Table 1A and 1B show that the average number of transacted 
primary homes has not been significantly affected by the policy in treated municipalities.  
5 Empirical research design 
5.1 Econometric framework and endogeneity issues 
Let 𝑦𝑖10−11 and 𝑦𝑖13−14 denote the outcome variable in municipality 𝑖 in 2010-2011 (pre-
period) and 2013-2014 (post-period), respectively. Focusing on the two years directly following 
the approval of the SHI allows us to empirically identify theoretical mechanisms of the ban that 
might disappear in the longer run.17  
To empirically test our model’s predictions, we consider prices of primary and secondary 
residences, wages and unemployment rates, and the number of elderly as outcome variables. 
These outcome variables capture wealth, local economy, and amenity effects, respectively. We 
start by estimating the following two-period difference-in-differences (DD) model:   
17 For example, one might expect the positive impact of the SHI on unemployment rates in treated areas to decrease 
over time, as local residents move to non-treated regions to access better employment opportunities. 
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ln (𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 +  𝛾𝐷𝑖 + 𝜏𝑑𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑑𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷1𝒙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷2𝒄𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , (9) 
where 𝐷𝑖 represents the observed treatment assignment defined according to the second home 
rate 𝑠𝑟𝑖 (after revisions were taken into account), 𝑑𝑡 is a time dummy equal to 1 for post-
initiative observations and zero otherwise, 𝒙𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of pre-determined covariates 
including information on local housing markets and fiscal variables, and 𝒄𝑖 is a vector of time-
invariant variables that captures locational and geographic features of the municipality, 
including canton fixed effects.18 The variable 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is a stochastic error term.
Unbiased estimation of the coefficient of interest 𝛿 is obtained if 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑠𝑟𝑖) = 0.
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sources of endogeneity may invalidate this assumption in our setting, namely omitted variable 
bias and out-of-treatment selection. To partially address the former, in a first step we partial out 
unobserved municipality heterogeneity by estimating the following first-difference (FD) model:  
Δln (𝑦𝑖13−14) = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷1Δ𝒙𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14,        (10) 
where the outcome variable is given by Δln (y𝑖13−14) = ln (𝑦𝑖13−14) − ln (𝑦𝑖10−11), the term 
Δ𝒙𝑖10−11 = 𝒙𝑖10−11 − 𝒙𝑖08−09 captures pre-determined dynamics, and  Δ𝑢𝑖13−14 = 𝑢𝑖13−14 −
𝑢𝑖10−11 denotes contemporaneous unobserved dynamics.  
To address the latter, in a second step we rely on an instrumental variable (IV) approach and 
estimate model (10) by 2SLS (FD-IV). More precisely, we instrument the observed treatment 
assignment as 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝜋𝑧𝑖00 + 𝜸1Δ𝒙𝑖10−11 + v𝑖 ,        (11) 
where the instrument 𝑧𝑖00 is given by the second home rate as measured in the 2000 Federal 
Population Census. This “historic” measure of second home rates is strongly correlated with 
the observed treatment dummy 1{𝑠𝑟𝑖 ≥ 0.2} – making it a relevant instrument – and could not 
have been manipulated by municipalities according to treatment assignment, thus removing 
endogeneity issues linked to out-of-treatment selection.  
The 2SLS estimate of the treatment effect is thus consistent if 𝐸(Δ𝑢𝑖13−14|𝑧𝑖00) = 0 and if the 
instrument affects outcome variables only through the first-stage equation (11). These two 
conditions may not be satisfied if the instrument captures permanent differences in the 
unobserved outcome dynamics between the control and treatment group after the effect of other 
control variables has been partialled out. In fact, we might worry that short-term outcome 
dynamics of major CBDs and suburban areas – which usually have low historical second home 
rates – differ in a sensible way from those of touristic areas, which have high historic second 
home rates.   
To partially solve this problem, we examine the robustness of our treatment estimates when we 
include the natural log of the pre-determined outcome variable 𝑦𝑖10−11 among our controls in 
the FD, and FD-IV models (𝑑𝑡 ∙ 𝑦𝑖10−11 in the case of the DD model). This variable allows us
18 Data on the share of individuals and firms active in the service sector was available only for 2011 and thus 
included in the “fixed” effects category for ease of exposition. See Web-Appendix C for further details. 
19 The reader may want to refer to the results’ section for a discussion of the parallel trends assumption.  
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to control for pre-policy differences in outcome levels, likely making the direct effect of 
‘historic’ second home rates on short-term outcome dynamics irrelevant. For example, 
municipalities with high initial levels of house prices or unemployment rates – such as CBDs – 
might have outcome dynamics that differ from those with low initial levels. This approach also 
allows us to control for mean reversion in the outcome variables.    
We further investigate the robustness of our FD-IV estimates by balancing treatment and control 
group. Specifically, we drop municipalities near major CBDs and highly touristic places from 
our sample. We employ two strategies. The first relies on directly excluding those municipalities 
situated within a 10 km radius from major CBDs and those adjacent to a major ski resort. The 
second follows Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) and is akin to a fuzzy regression discontinuity 
design: We drop municipalities within a 10 km radius from major CBDs while restricting the 
sample to municipalities that have a second home rate between 15 and 30%.20 To the extent that 
dynamic unobservables are balanced in our restricted samples – Altonji et al. (2005) suggest 
that balancing according to observed covariates may indeed reduce omitted variable bias – the 
two approaches provide consistent estimates of the treatment effect even when the instrument 
is not exogenous for the whole sample, i.e. even when 𝐸(Δ𝑢𝑖13−14|𝑧𝑖00) ≠ 0.
21 Additionally, the
exclusion restriction is likely satisfied for the restricted samples, as permanent differences 
between control and treatment group have been removed. The two approaches are data 
demanding – the sample size is considerably reduced – which translates into a higher variance 
of the estimated treatment effect.     
6 Results 
6.1 Constraining second home investments: impacts on local residents 
Table 2 documents standard cross-sectional DD estimates according to equation (9).22 To test 
the predictions of our theoretical model, we consider the price of primary homes (columns 1-
3), unemployment rates23 (columns 4-6), and the number of elderly living in the municipality 
(columns 7-9) as outcomes variables. For each of these outcome variables, we progressively 
increase the set of controls. To ease the comparison between DD and first-differenced models, 
we include in our sample only municipalities for which housing transactions occurred both 
before and after the SHI approval.  
20 We combine a sample restriction based on second home rates with CBD exclusion because some major urban 
areas in the control group – such as Geneva and Bern – have second home rates in the narrow band of 15%-20% 
below the threshold set by the SHI. 
21 We do not include second home rates (or polynomials thereof) in our specifications. This is because only a few 
municipalities in the treated group have second home rates in the 20%-30% interval. Using the Frisch-Waugh 
theorem it is easy to show that, when including second home rates as control, treatment effect estimates are driven 
by data points where the second home rate doesn’t predict treatment assignment well, i.e. by those points close to 
the threshold. This considerably increases the standard errors of the estimated treatment effect.  
22 We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Clustering standard errors by cantons – which are the “most 
aggregate” institutional entities in Switzerland – does not alter the statistical significance of our main results. See 
the results in Web Appendix D. However, standard errors may not be reliable due to the small number of clusters. 
23 We report wage results separately in Section 6.3. We motivate our focus on unemployment rates to capture the 
negative local economy effect with the fact that in Switzerland wages are extremely sticky downwards. 
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DD estimates suggest a strong negative impact of the second home ban on the price growth of 
primary homes: on average, the SHI lowered the price growth of primary homes by about 12 to 
15%. The estimated average treatment effect is highly significant, independent of the set of 
included controls. The stability of treatment estimates to the inclusion of the pre-determined 
level of the dependent variable (interacted with time FEs) suggests that pre-policy differences 
in the price of primary homes do not strongly affect post-policy prices (the increase in the 
adjusted R squared is quite modest). 
Unemployment growth rates also seem to have been negatively affected by the SHI, with a 
relative increase of about 8-10%. Results are less statistically significant than in the case of the 
price of primary homes, but remain extremely stable to the inclusion of additional controls. 
Indeed, the lack of statistical significance of the treatment effect in column 4 seems to be due 
to lack of precision, which is lessened when adding controls (the adjusted R squared increases 
considerably when including controls). Remarkably, pre-existing patterns of the outcome 
variable hardly affect the magnitude of the treatment estimates.     
Estimation results are less clear-cut for the growth in the number of elderly living in the 
municipality. The first two specifications show statistically insignificant treatment effects close 
to zero, suggesting that the SHI had no effect on the sorting behavior of the elderly. However, 
adding pre-determined levels of this outcome variable strongly affects the estimated treatment 
effect, which becomes strongly positive and highly significant. Despite being in line with our 
model prediction, we interpret this finding with some skepticism, as it likely hints more to an 
omitted variable bias problem than at a true effect. In fact, sorting of the elderly likely depends 
on factors not measured by our controls, such as family ties and access to healthcare services.  
Table 3 illustrates the estimated average treatment effects when estimating our FD-model 
(equation (10)) that partials out unobserved municipality heterogeneity. The estimated impact 
on the price growth of primary residences remains negative and highly significant, with the 
most conservative estimate suggesting a drop in price growth of 14%. The role played by the 
pre-determined level of primary housing prices seems to become more relevant, although all 
estimates remain about 1.5 standard deviations from each other across specifications.  
Magnitudes of FD estimates reported in Table 3 for unemployment rates are similar to those of 
Table 2, with an increase in unemployment growth of about 7 to 8% across specifications. First 
differencing allow us to increase the precision of our estimates, which become highly 
significant (at the 1% level) across all specifications.  
The impact of the SHI on the sorting behavior of elderly remains insignificant and close to zero 
for the first two specifications, as shown in columns (7) and (8) of Table 3. Adding 
predetermined levels of the outcome variable turns the treatment effect coefficient weakly 
statistically significant and negative, contrary to our model prediction. The change of sign with 
respect to the DD estimate reported in column (9) of Table 2 supports the hypothesis that 
endogeneity problems may still be present. We try to address them in the following models.  
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Table 4 reports treatment effects when equation (10) is estimated using our IV approach outlined 
in equation (11). This allows us to partially address endogeneity concern related to potential 
omitted variable bias and out-of-treatment selection. The FD-IV model is our preferred 
approach and its estimates are used as benchmark in subsequent robustness checks. Panel A 
shows second-stage results and Panel B first-stage ones.  
Reassuringly, instrumenting second home rates in 2012 with their lagged value in 2000 hardly 
affects the estimated treatment effects for the price of primary homes. The estimated drop in 
the price growth of primary homes as a consequence of the second home ban is about 15% 
(preferred estimate reported in column (2)). The FD-IV estimates for unemployment rates 
increase in magnitude with respect to the FD estimates and are similar to the DD ones, 
suggesting a relative increase in the growth of the unemployment rate of about 12% (preferred 
specification reported in column (5)). The fact that the FD and the FD-IV results for the price 
of primary homes and for the unemployment rate are quite similar implies that municipalities 
may not have used the option to revise their second home rate endogenously according to labor 
and housing market conditions.  Lastly, as columns (7) to (9) of Table 4 reveal, the treatment 
effect of the ban on the growth of the elderly population is statistically insignificant and close 
to zero in all specifications, suggesting that the second home ban did not affect sorting of the 
elderly. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are extremely high for all specifications, suggesting 
that weak identification is not a problem in any of the estimated models.   
To summarize, we find compelling evidence of a strong negative effect of the SHI on the price 
growth of primary homes (adverse wealth effect) and a strong positive effect on the 
unemployment growth rate (adverse economy effect), both of which are in line with the 
predictions of our theoretical model. We do not find a statistically significant effect of the SHI 
on sorting of the elderly in our preferred FD-IV specifications casting some doubt on a positive 
anticipated amenity effect of the SHI.24 All in all, our results seem to suggest that the negative 
unintended consequences of restricting second home investments far outweigh the positive 
intended ones. 
6.2 Impact of unobserved dynamics on treatment estimates for primary residents 
One concern about the validity of FD-IV estimates is whether such estimates are affected by 
intrinsic differences between control and treatment groups. To the extent that our “historic” 
instrument captures persistent differences between the two groups – which in turn correlate with 
short-term dynamics – treatment effect estimates may not be consistent. To mitigate this 
concern, we balance observed covariates in the treatment and control groups by using two 
alternative sample restrictions, discussed above. Of course, balancing observable covariates 
24 A positive amenity effect may not materialize for a few years to come. This is because the ban did not apply to 
already approved second home projects and construction of these projects takes time. However, if the ban on 
second homes is indeed perceived to positively affect the landscape in the medium and longer run, one would 
expect that the elderly move to the treated areas in anticipation of this effect. This also implies that if there is a 
positive amenity effect, the expectations of this should be positively capitalized into house prices today, at least 
partially offsetting the negative economy effect on house prices. 
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does not ensure that unobservable ones are balanced as well, but likely reduces considerably 
the bias coming from omitted variables (Altonji et al. 2005). Additionally, as pointed out by 
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), balancing covariates makes irrelevant the (linear) functional-
form assumption between an outcome variable and the covariates.  
Table 5 documents the results when testing whether observed covariates are orthogonal to the 
observed treatment status. More specifically, we test the orthogonality of two groups of controls 
included in equation (10):  levels of pre-policy outcome variables and dynamic (lagged first-
differenced) controls. Columns 1-6 report the mean of the covariates in the control and treated 
group i) for the full sample used in Tables 2-4 (columns 1-2), ii) when we drop municipalities 
situated within a 10 km radius from major CBDs and/or are adjacent to a major ski resort 
(columns 3-4), and iii) when we exclude municipalities within a 10 km radius from major CBDs 
and/or having a second home rate below 15 or above 30% (columns 5-6). 25 The last three 
columns show the p-values of the difference in mean test for each one of the considered 
samples. We mark in bold p-values below 10%.  
The first three columns in Table 5 reveal that several covariates are not balanced in the full 
sample: pre SHI the average number of parking places was decreasing in control municipalities 
while increasing in treated ones, and the inequality of the net income distribution was increasing 
more markedly in treated municipalities than in control ones. A highly significant difference in 
means (p-value<1%) is also observed for the price of primary homes. This is hardly surprising. 
As predicted by the monocentric city model, locations near major CBDs (contained in the 
control group) have significantly higher house prices than those further out. Additionally, 
elderly were much more present in the control group, likely due to the proximity to better health 
care services and family ties. Interestingly, we do not observe any marked difference in the 
predetermined patterns of unemployment rates. This is likely due to long-run sorting 
mechanisms, which tend to equalize unemployment across municipalities: people migrate to 
where they can find work. However, importantly, dropping major urban areas and ski resorts 
from our sample balances all the covariates except the pre-determined price of primary homes, 
and combining CBD distance with second home rate restrictions balances all covariates.    
Table 6 and 7 report results for the FD-IV model when implementing the two sample 
restrictions. Dropping major CBDs and highly touristic places makes the negative impact of the 
initiative on the growth price of primary homes somewhat stronger, with estimates ranging from 
about 17 to 24%. The negative impact on unemployment growth becomes slightly less 
pronounced – the treatment effect is estimated to be between 9 and 10% – and its statistical 
significance is reduced with respect to the FD-IV estimates without sample restrictions. The 
impact on the growth rate of the number of elderly is slightly more positive across all 
specifications but remains statistically insignificant. The even stricter sample restriction – 
25 As apparent from the number of observations reported in Table 5, this corresponds to one of the strictest 
restrictions allowing us to provide stable FD estimates. Figure 3 indeed shows that we are selecting municipalities 
at the tail of the second home rate distribution.  
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dropping locations near major CBDs and confining second home rates to between 15 and 30% 
– further amplifies the negative effect of the ban on the price growth of primary homes and the
positive effect on the unemployment growth rate. Both effects are highly statistically 
significant. The positive effect for the number of elderly remains not significant. We interpret 
the magnitude of the estimated effects in the most stringent sample restriction with due caution, 
as the sample size – and in particular the number of municipalities belonging to the treatment 
group – becomes extremely low, thus considerably increasing the variance of our estimates.  
We draw two conclusions from our analysis thus far. First, including unbalanced covariates as 
controls seems to neither affect full sample estimates (Table 4) nor estimates of restricted 
samples (Tables 6 and 7). Second, making the covariates more balanced does not affect the 
direction and statistical significance of the estimated treatment effects, although estimated 
magnitudes become somewhat inflated in our most rigorous specification with the most 
constrained sample. Overall, these conclusions strongly suggest that predetermined differences 
between treatment and control groups – which could invalidate our IV approach – do not 
strongly affect the FD-IV estimates.   
6.3 Constraining second home investments: impact on existing second home investors 
Another pertinent question is whether the SHI affected the price growth of second homes. Only 
a small percentage of second homes are traded below the threshold set by the SHI and these are 
traded only in a small number of control-municipalities. This lack of data makes estimating the 
treatment effect on second homes extremely challenging. In particular, we cannot reliably 
estimate FD and FD-IV models because very few municipalities are present in the control group 
in these samples.26 These caveats aside, in an attempt to nevertheless shed some light on the 
impact of the SHI on the price growth of second homes, we estimate a DD model as in equation 
(9), but to increase sample size, we do not restrict the sample to municipalities for which 
housing transactions were observed both before and after the SHI ordinance came into force. 
We report results in Table 8. The sign of the treatment effect is positive and fairly stable across 
specifications. Once controls are included in the model the effect becomes statistically 
significant, although weakly so.  
This finding is consistent with our theoretical model that assumes poor substitutability between 
primary and second homes. This should not be too surprising in the case of Switzerland’s 
touristic areas. Second homes are usually located where access to ski resorts is easiest, are built 
using specific materials – wood-built chalets – and usually lack some of the comforts of primary 
residences, such as access to broadband connection and covered parking garages. Additionally, 
it may be that primary homes that were good substitutes for second homes were already 
converted into second homes during the past, leaving only properties without conversion 
potential in the stock of primary residences. 
26 Even in the less restrictive FD specification, estimates become erratic when including predetermined controls. 
24 
Another possible explanation is that post SHI-implementation, primary residences that retained 
a conversion option systematically dropped out from our sample – as they were sold as second 
homes – thus causing a selection bias. This seems unlikely for two reasons. First, primary homes 
built before 2012 do retain a conversion option. If they are systematically sold as second homes, 
it means that potential primary residents prefer to buy properties that do not have a conversion 
option, an unlikely case. Second, if primary residences that have a conversion option are 
systematically converted post policy, we should observe a significant drop in the number of 
transacted primary residences in treated municipalities, and this did not happen (see Figure 5).27   
6.4 Other results and robustness checks 
Negative economy effect and wages 
The results of the previous sections suggest that the SHI negatively affects local economies of 
treated municipalities by increasing the unemployment growth rate. This finding is consistent 
with a setting where wages are sticky downwards. In our theoretical framework, however, we 
assume that wages are flexible, thus predicting a negative impact of the ban on local wage 
growth. To test this proposition we report results for employees’ wages in Appendix Table A2, 
employing a FD-IV model. The ban does not seem to significantly affect wage growth once 
pre-trends in wages are accounted for and when the control and the treated group are balanced. 
In line with our model, the impact of the ban becomes negative for the model with the strictest 
sample restriction. However, the effect is small in magnitude and not statistically significant.  
Our wage results seem sensible in the context of the Swiss institutional setting. This is for two 
reasons. First, it is extremely uncommon for employers, due to de facto ‘upward-only’ wage 
adjustments at industry level, to be able to renegotiate wages for existing workers downwards. 
Second, by international standards Switzerland has one of the most liberal labor laws. For 
example, employers can terminate a ten year (or more) employment relationship by giving a 
three month-notice and without providing any justification for it. Thus, it would appear to be 
much easier for firms to fire workers to counter an expected negative shock to the local 
economy than to lower wages. 
Sorting and heterogeneous treatment effects 
Our theoretical framework predicts heterogeneous treatment effects 𝛿𝑖 for a given outcome to 
the extent that the growth in the number of second home investors varies across municipalities. 
Workers might sort into or out of a treated municipality according to the expected gain/loss in 
order to maximize their utility (selection on gains) and second home investors may shift their 
housing demand to the nearest control municipalities (i.e., the closest substitutes). What does 
the causal effect 𝛿 represent when heterogeneous effects are present? To answer this question, 
27 Municipalities had to ascertain that the conversion of primary residences into secondary ones was not driven by 
pure speculative motives. For example, primary homeowners were not allowed to convert their residence and 
directly build/buy a new one in the same (or nearby) municipality.  
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we must assess whether sorting of households according to the treatment status did occur. Let 
us consider the random coefficient version of equation (10): 
Δln (𝑦𝑖13−14) = 𝜏 + 𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷1Δ𝒙𝑖10−11 + Δ𝑢𝑖13−14 = 
        𝜏 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖 + 𝜷1Δ𝒙𝑖10−11 + (𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿)𝐷𝑖+Δ𝑢𝑖13−14,     (12) 
where 𝛿𝑖 represents the heterogeneous effect of the SHI on municipality 𝑖. The treatment effect 
𝛿 estimated by model (12) is biased if the heterogeneous effect 𝛿𝑖 correlates with the treatment 
assignment 𝐷𝑖, i.e. 𝐸((𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿)𝐷𝑖) ≠ 0. This corresponds to sorting of households across 
municipalities with respect to potential gains.  
However, our findings so far are indicative that sorting may not be of primary importance in 
our empirical setting. In fact, if sorting of households and investors were present, we should 
observe a shift in the distribution of primary and second home transactions with respect to the 
municipalities’ second home rates. This, however, is not the case. The histogram of transactions 
presented in Figure 5 shows no evident change in the distribution of transacted primary and 
second homes pre- and post-SHI, suggesting that sorting from treated municipalities to control 
ones – and vice versa – did not take place.  
To test more formally whether sorting of households occurred, we estimate the impact of the 
SHI on the growth of the resident population – including both homeowners and renters – for 
the full sample and for the two sample restrictions discussed in the previous section. Appendix 
Table A3 reveals that the impact of the ban on the resident population is not statistically 
significant and close to zero in magnitude across all specifications, suggesting that the SHI did 
not affect population growth in treated municipalities.  
To further verify the robustness of our previous estimates to potential sorting effects, we 
estimate the FD-IV model for the price of primary homes, unemployment rates, and the number 
of elderly when we use as control group municipalities situated more than 5 kilometers away 
from the nearest treated ones (see Figure 3 for a visual representation of dropped 
municipalities). Excluding municipalities near treated ones allows us to exclude those places 
where households and investors are most likely to sort into according to the incentives created 
by the initiative. For example, households may move to the nearest municipality not affected 
by the ban to find a job. Similarly, second home investors may shift their housing demand to 
those non-restricted municipalities in closest proximity to major natural amenities. Appendix 
Table A4 documents the results. Reassuringly, the estimated impacts are virtually identical to 
our baseline estimates reported in Table 4.28 The choice of a 5 km distance band is arbitrary. In 
a next step, we thus vary this distance band continuously to document that the estimated effects 
of our FD-IV specifications are robust to the choice of the distance band. The results are 
28 To the extent that second home rates capture the proximity to major natural amenities better than physical 
distance, municipalities in the control group that have a second home rate close to the threshold might also have 
been impacted by the ban through a shift of the demand. We thus experimented by dropping municipalities in the 
control group that have a second home rate between 15% and 20%. The restriction leaves the baseline estimates 
of Table 4 unchanged.  
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illustrated in Figure 6. The estimates are extremely stable over a wide range of distance bands 
used to exclude the nearest-to-treated control municipalities, providing further evidence that 
the potential spatial sorting of individuals across municipalities is not relevant in our setup.29  
We explain the absence of sorting of households across municipalities as follows. First, as 
argued by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), sorting of individuals in response to economic 
incentives is likely to occur in the long-run. As our analysis takes place right after the 
implementation of the SHI ordinance, sorting mechanisms may simply not have had enough 
time yet to materialize. Second, local residents may not consider second home investors as a 
disamenity, which would eliminate any positive effect of the ban. Our voting analysis indeed 
seems to suggest that the SHI was approved for social envy reasons of primary residents in non-
affected (control) areas more than anything else. Third, the SHI reinforced the price differential 
of primary residences located in control and treated municipalities. This implies lower asset 
values of primary homeowners in treated locations post-ban and suggests that they may no 
longer have had sufficient wealth to buy a similar property in a control-location.30 Fourth, the 
entire second home demand in municipalities that did not exceed the threshold is very small 
(less than 0.5% of the total transactions of primary residences), thus hardly affecting local price 
growth of primary homes in non-treated areas. Fifth, investors may value the close proximity 
to amenities – such as ski resorts – and would rather invest in a neighboring country (e.g. Austria 
or France) than losing the benefit of this proximity (i.e., even nearby municipalities may not be 
sufficiently close substitutes).   
Conversion option and the impact of age-related characteristics 
In our main analysis we dropped primary houses built after 2012 (i.e., houses that no longer 
possess a conversion option) from our regression sample to be able to compare ‘like with like’ 
housing units pre and post the ban.  
To disentangle the impact of the SHI on age-related characteristics from its ‘direct’ effect on 
the price of primary homes, in a first step, we re-estimate our FD-IV model including primary 
houses built after 2012 back into our regression sample. The obtained treatment effect can be 
interpreted as the ‘total' effect of the SHI – the sum of a compositional effect (more older, less 
valuable properties may be traded post ban) and a direct effect (i.e., the effect we are primarily 
interested in). In a second step, we construct a hedonic price index for age-related characteristics 
and analyze how this price index was affected by the ban. More precisely, we estimate the 
following equation using the price of primary homes over the 2008-2009 period as outcome 
variable:  
ln (𝑃𝑖08−09) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖08−09  + 𝛼2𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖08−09 + 𝛼3𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖08−09 + 𝜖𝑖08−09,   (13) 
29 These results suggest that the demand of second home investors may not have shifted from treated- to control-
municipalities post-SHI but, instead, the fixed shares of income that ‘marginal’ investors spent for second homes 
and tourism services pre-SHI may have shifted to a reservation locale outside Switzerland post-SHI, consistent 
with our theoretical framework. 
30 The scenario in which homeowners sells their properties to become renters in non-restricted municipalities seems 
highly unlikely.  
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where age, condition, and quality are age-related characteristics for the same period. The 
estimated parameters ?̂?𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0,1,2,3 allow us to predict (the log of) the price of primary homes 
ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡)̂  before (2010-2011) and after (2013-2014) the ban while keeping the valuation of these
characteristics fixed. We then estimate the FD-IV model using the predicted log prices as 
outcome variables (without including age-related characteristics as controls). The estimated 
effect describes the composition effect (i.e., the effect of the ban on primary house prices via 
affecting age-related characteristics). The difference between the estimates of the first and 
second step corresponds to the direct effect of the ban on the price of primary homes.   
Appendix Tables A5 and A6 document FD-IV estimates for total and composition effects, 
respectively. To deal with potential endogeneity linked to unobserved trends, each table reports 
the robustness of the estimated treatment effects for the sample restrictions discussed in the 
previous section. Table A5 reports treatment estimates of the total effect of the ban on the price 
growth of primary homes that are very similar to those reported in Tables 4, 6 and 7. Table A6 
reveals that the composition effect is statistically significant and economically meaningful 
(around -5% in the preferred estimate) for the full sample, however becomes statistically 
completely insignificant when imposing sample restrictions with the effect going close to zero 
for the more rigorous of the two restrictions. 
The above results are indicative that i) excluding houses without a conversion option from our 
sample does not greatly affect our main FD-IV treatment estimates, and ii) composition effects 
of age-related characteristic are not of significant importance in our setting: the total treatment 
effect of the ban on the price growth of primary homes appears to be similar to the direct effect. 
Interestingly, these conclusions add a further piece of evidence in favor of the poor 
substitutability assumption between primary and second homes. In fact, if the value of the 
conversion option approaches zero due to poor substitutability, there is no economic incentive 
for residents to buy older houses that potentially can still be converted, making the composition 
effect irrelevant.    
Placebo test and the parallel trends assumption 
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to verify that no treatment effect was present before the policy 
implementation. Specifically, we use the years 2006-2007 and 2008-2009 as pre-policy periods, 
and 2010-2011 as post-policy period. As no data on the number of elderly living in a 
municipality are available before 2010, we only report placebo tests for the price of primary 
homes and unemployment rates.31 Appendix Table A7 reports the estimation results for the FD-
IV model. The treatment effect is statistically insignificant and close to zero in all cases.  
These results suggests that i) pre-policy growth rates of the price of primary homes and of the 
unemployment rate are orthogonal to the observed treatment status, and ii) individuals did not 
anticipate the effect of the ban. Our placebo test is also a test for parallel trends in the pre-policy 
periods. As parallel trends is the main identifying assumption in DD models, these results help 
explain why the treatment effect estimates presented in Table 2 are similar to those reported in 
Tables 3 and 4. The fact that pre-ban outcome dynamics are not different adds further credibility 
31 We also note that because no data on the share of foreign residents was available prior to 2008, we had to exclude 
this variable from our estimated model.  
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to our main FD-IV estimates, as historic second home rates do not seem to capture permanent 
differences between treatment and control groups through the first-stage equation. Put 
differently, if historic second home rates were simply dividing major CBDs from highly 
touristic places through the treatment assignment, and these areas have permanently different 
outcome dynamics, then the pre-ban treatment effect should be significant. This, however, is 
not the case.    
7 Conclusion 
Rising inequality has led to a global political backlash against wealthy elites. One increasingly 
popular policy is to constrain or impose an outright ban on new second home investments in 
high-amenity places (highly touristic places or superstar cities). We propose a dynamic general 
equilibrium model that describes the mechanisms through which this policy may affect primary 
residents and existing second home investors.  
Local residents face a basic trade-off. Constraints on second home investments hurt the local 
economy but provide benefits in the form of landscape preservation effects. Theory suggests 
that the predicted impact on the price growth of primary homes depends on a number of factors: 
whether primary and second homes are close substitutes, whether local residents attach a strong 
disamenity value to the presence of second home investors, and the local labor output elasticity 
in the tourism sector.  
Exploiting the unique empirical setting provided by the unexpected approval of the SHI in 
March 2012, we find that the ban on the construction of new second homes reduced the price 
growth of primary homes in the areas that were affected by the ban by around 15% and 
increased the growth in the unemployment rate by about 12%. We do not find a positive 
(anticipated) landscape preservation effect. Estimating the effect of the ban on the price growth 
of second homes is challenging due to a small sample size issue. This caveat aside, our DD 
results suggest that the ban increased the price growth of second homes by about 26%.  
Our findings are consistent with the view that primary homes in Swiss tourist areas are poor 
substitutes for second homes. In a setting with poor substitutability, in the extreme, the option 
to convert a primary residence into a second home is worthless and it does not provide a hedge 
against the negative impact of banning investors.  
Constraining new second home investments hurts local homeowners via higher unemployment 
growth rates and lower price growth of primary homes. Renters benefit from lower rents but 
overall they are not better off. This is because the fall in rents is likely commensurate to the 
negative local economy effect. In a spatial equilibrium setting without relocation costs, renters 
should be neither better nor worse off. Our empirical findings indicate that existing second home 
investors were the real beneficiaries in the treated areas: The estimated effect of the ban on the 
price growth of second homes is consistently positive, representing a positive wealth effect for 
owners of such homes. 
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Our findings hold important lessons for other countries with highly touristic areas, in which 
inequality has led to a political backlash against the wealthy and, in particular, against (foreign) 
second home investors. Overall, our findings are indicative that constraining second home 
investments may reinforce rather than reduce wealth inequality in highly touristic areas. While 
bans do nothing to improve local economies, local taxes on the value of land or (investment) 
property could potentially help local economies whilst at the same time preserve the landscape. 
To what extent our findings also apply to superstar cities is less clear-cut. Labor markets of 
large superstar cities are much more diversified and less dependent on second home buyers. If 
a ban on second home investments reduces upward pressure on housing rents and prices, then 
both local labor supply and local wages may go up. This is because in the case of superstar 
cities, labor markets may not depend much on the consumption of goods and services by the 
investors in second homes. Instead, lower housing costs will attract more labor to superstar 
cities. In the presence of agglomeration externalities, this may raise local wages and may lead 
to an increase in the aggregate productivity of an entire country, as in Hsieh and Moretti (2017). 
We leave the analysis of these effects for future research. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1A 
Summary statistics – Municipalities with share of second homes below 20%-threshold (control group) 
2010-2011 2013-2014 
VARIABLES (municipality level averages) Min Max Mean Sd Min Max Mean Sd 
Price of primary homes (1'000 CHF) 120 3’040 745.46 333.35 120 2’880 805.33 332.31 
Unemployment rate (%)† 0.00 4.14 1.32 0.61 0.16 3.99 1.31 0.58 
Wages (1’000 CHF) 38.21 195.48 67.95 16.00 40.75 203.23 69.01 15.97 
Nb. of elderly (1'000) 0.01 62.45 0.77 2.37 0.01 62.23 0.84 2.42 
Housing characteristics (primary homes) 
Number of rooms 2 12 4.85 0.84 2 11 4.74 0.88 
Number of bathrooms 1 4 2.05 0.43 1 4 2.03 0.44 
Number of parking places 0 3 0.87 0.52 0 3 0.82 0.52 
Micro-location (1 to 4’ bad to excellent) 1 4 2.92 0.40 1 4 2.76 0.40 
Quality (standard of finishing) (1 to 4’ bad to excellent) 1 4 2.96 0.54 1 4 2.85 0.55 
Condition (1 to 4’ bad to excellent) 1 4 2.91 0.58 1 4 2.82 0.62 
Age of building at time of transaction†† -1 161 28.39 25.44 -1 164 29.62 26.26 
Single-family house (yes/no) 0 1 0.61 0.32 0 1 0.59 0.34 
Number of transactions 1 798 14.94 33.85 1 855 13.23 32.17 
Fiscal variables 
Foreign residents (%) 0.62 51.67 16.09 9.40 0.24 55.09 17.48 9.62 
Mean net income (1'000 CHF) 40.16 341.34 68.54 23.33 
Net income Gini index 0.31 0.81 0.44 0.06 
Other municipality characteristics (time-invariant or predetermined) 
Second home rate (%) 1.60 34.30 11.32 4.70 
Voting No (%) 28.70 84.20 50.38 7.12 
Resident population (1'000) 0.13 374.92 4.54 13.69 
Unproductive surface (%) 0.00 86.70 2.90 6.36 
Distance to major city (km) 0 75.79 10.88 11.09 
Distance to major ski resort (km) 0 78.91 34.44 19.80 
Pct. of workers in the 3rd sector (%) 5.00 99.00 57.77 17.73 
Pct. of firms in the 3rd sector (%) 15.00 94.00 64.65 14.45 
Number of new residential buildings (1'000) 0 1.75 0.03 0.07 
Number of municipalities 1556 1524 
Note † Unemployment rates are expressed relative to the total population of a municipality.  †† The age of the building at the time of transaction is defined as the year in which the transaction takes 
place minus the construction year. Since some dwellings are sold before being constructed, the age variable can take negative values. 
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TABLE 1B 
Summary statistics – Municipalities with share of second homes at or above 20%-threshold (treatment group) 
2010-2011 2013-2014 
VARIABLES (municipality level averages) Min Max Mean Sd Min Max Mean Sd 
Price of primary homes (1'000 CHF) 100 3’366.67 608.77 366.37 100 2’396.67 592.07 312.74 
Unemployment rate (%)† 0.21 4.13 1.27 0.66 0.14 4.44 1.35 0.65 
Wages (1’000 CHF) 35.05 99.79 55.66 9.00 32.85 325.21 58.30 19.37 
Nb. of elderly (1'000) 0.01 4.60 0.36 0.48 0.01 4.88 0.42 0.53 
Housing characteristics (primary homes) 
Number of rooms 2 10 4.25 1.19 1 9 4.09 1.18 
Number of bathrooms 1 4 1.85 0.47 1 4 1.79 0.52 
Number of parking places 0 2 0.61 0.50 0 2 0.58 0.50 
Micro-location (1 to 4’ bad to excellent) 1 4 3.09 0.48 1 4 2.89 0.52 
Quality (standard of finishing) (1 to 4’ bad to excellent) 1 4 2.73 0.67 1 4 2.52 0.64 
Condition (1 to 4’ bad to excellent) 1 4 2.68 0.71 1 4 2.50 0.75 
Age of building at time of transaction†† -0.83 161 32.57 28.64 0 164 36.91 29.65 
Single-family house (yes/no) 0 1 0.49 0.40 0 1 0.50 0.41 
Number of transactions 1 121 7.12 12.85 1 148 6.25 12.46 
Fiscal variables 
Foreign residents (%) 0.00 61.18 15.90 10.26 1.79 60.75 17.14 10.25 
Mean net income (1'000 CHF) 26.05 96.82 50.80 11.29 
Net income Gini index 0.38 0.71 0.49 0.07 
Other municipality characteristics (time-invariant or predetermined) 
Second home rate (%) 20.30 86.10 47.88 17.21 
Voting No (%) 26.20 88.90 60.99 12.47 
Resident population (1'000) 0.03 24.89 1.87 2.58 
Unproductive surface (%) 0.00 95.00 22.73 22.27 
Distance to major city (km) 0 102.52 36.82 24.78 
Distance to major ski resort (km) 0 81.03 15.33 22.10 
Pct. of workers in the 3rd sector (%) 0.00 95.00 61.63 18.41 
Pct. of firms in the 3rd sector (%) 0.00 94.00 62.93 15.07 
Number of new residential buildings (1'000) 0 0.15 0.01 0.02 
Number of municipalities 276 255 
Note: † Unemployment rates are expressed relative to the total population of a municipality.  †† The age of the building at the time of transaction is defined as the year in which the transaction 
takes place minus the construction year. Since some dwellings are sold before being constructed, the age variable can take negative values.   
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TABLE 2 
DD estimates 
Dependent variable Log price of primary homes Log unemployment rate Log elderly 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Observed treatment × Post -0.142** -0.152*** -0.119*** 0.0787 0.0823* 0.0969** -0.00725 0.0121 0.184*** 
(0.0571) (0.0450) (0.0456) (0.0602) (0.0428) (0.0396) (0.102) (0.0855) (0.0693) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE and lagged controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 2,812 
R-squared 0.054 0.571 0.577 0.001 0.670 0.693 0.014 0.649 0.737 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable 
for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data 
into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged controls. Data is aggregated at the municipality level by 
computing two-year averages in these periods. The considered sample pools data on municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the SHI. 
Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation.   
TABLE 3 
 FD estimates 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate ∆ Log elderly 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Observed treatment -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.191*** 0.0787*** 0.0757*** 0.0651*** -0.00725 -0.00676 -0.0116* 
(0.0386) (0.0376) (0.0365) (0.0231) (0.0236) (0.0230) (0.00645) (0.00653) (0.00667) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 
R-squared 0.020 0.128 0.196 0.012 0.023 0.122 0.001 0.012 0.065 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable 
for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data 
into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the 
municipality level by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the 
SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation.   
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TABLE 4 
 FD-IV estimates 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate ∆ Log elderly 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Observed treatment -0.152*** -0.147*** -0.190*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.00246 0.00322 -0.00205 
(0.0461) (0.0448) (0.0443) (0.0252) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.00839) (0.00840) (0.00849) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1623 1619 1632 1623 1619 1620 1623 1619 1627 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
2000 second home rate 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.043*** 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.067*** 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.063*** 
(0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0506) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0513) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0511) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable 
for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data 
into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the 
municipality level by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the 
SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using 
second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000.  
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TABLE 5 
FD covariates balance 
 Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated 
p-values 
 - -  CBD>10 km & Ski>0 km  CBD>10 km & 15%-30%  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (4) (5) vs. (6) 
No. Observations 1,230 176 446 56 107 22 - - - 
          
log(𝑦10−11)          
Price of primary homes 6.56 6.34 6.49 6.27 6.44 6.42 0.00 0.00 0.87 
Unemployment rate -4.36 -4.42 -4.40 -4.39 -4.31 -4.31 0.10 0.89 0.99 
No of elderly 6.05 5.70 5.83 5.62 5.97 5.66 0.00 0.13 0.23 
          
∆𝑥10−11          
No. of rooms -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 0.00 0.75 0.96 0.64 
No. of bathrooms 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.44 0.22 0.88 
No. of park places -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.02 0.28 0.27 
Quality 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.17 0.30 0.46 0.77 0.34 0.40 
Condition -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.33 0.49 0.76 0.10 
Micro location 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.48 0.74 0.72 
Age 1.25 -0.05 0.46 -1.90 -5.02 0.27 0.52 0.57 0.51 
House -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.69 0.30 0.78 
Average net income 1.06 1.00 0.91 1.13 1.20 1.00 0.93 0.64 0.80 
Gini net income 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.33 0.36 
No. transactions -0.43 -0.16 -0.14 -0.46 -0.14 -0.91 0.75 0.74 0.65 
Foreign share 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.76 0.41 0.10 
No. of new residences 2.84 -0.27 2.87 1.22 5.11 8.00 0.31 0.66 0.68 
Notes: Columns (1)-(6) report the means of FD and FD-IV controls for the full sample of municipalities considered in Tables 2, 3, and 4 (columns 1-2), when municipalities within 10 km 
from major CBDs or adjacent to major ski resorts are dropped (columns 3-4), and when municipalities within 10 km from major CBDs and with a second home rate outside the [0.15, 0.3] 
interval are excluded. The last three columns report p-values for the test of difference in means between control and treated group according to the considered sample. The p-values lower 
than 0.1 are marked in bold.   
 
 
 
37 
 
TABLE 6 
FD-IV estimates: Exclusion of municipalities near major CBDs and ski resorts 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate ∆ Log elderly  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Observed treatment -0.172** -0.195*** -0.237*** 0.0962* 0.0931* 0.105* 0.0144 0.0174 0.0145 
 (0.0734) (0.0703) (0.0661) (0.0568) (0.0546) (0.0563) (0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 502 
Kleibergen-Paap F 536.8 524.9 517.4 536.8 524.9 520 536.8 524.9 526.7 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.150*** 2.173*** 2.146*** 2.150*** 2.173*** 2.175*** 2.150*** 2.173*** 2.171*** 
 (0.0928) (0.0949) (0.0943) (0.0928) (0.0949) (0.0954) (0.0928) (0.0949) (0.0946) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable 
for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data 
into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the 
municipality level by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the 
SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using 
second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000. Municipalities within 10 km from major CBDs or adjacent to major ski resorts are dropped.  
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TABLE 7 
FD-IV estimates: Fuzzy RDD 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate ∆ Log elderly  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Observed treatment -0.561*** -0.370** -0.353** 0.243* 0.291** 0.251** 0.0197 0.0279 0.0265 
 (0.169) (0.149) (0.149) (0.125) (0.116) (0.105) (0.0283) (0.0305) (0.0303) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Kleibergen-Paap F 35.02 38.55 37.71 35.02 38.55 37.01 35.02 38.55 37.15 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.689*** 2.848*** 2.868*** 2.689*** 2.848*** 2.852*** 2.689*** 2.848*** 2.814*** 
 (0.454) (0.459) (0.467) (0.454) (0.459) (0.469) (0.454) (0.459) (0.462) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable 
for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data 
into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the 
municipality level by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the 
SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using 
second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000. Municipalities within 10 km from major CBDs and/or having a second home rate outside the [0.15, 0.3] interval 
are dropped.  
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TABLE 8 
DD estimates: Impact on the price growth of second homes  
Dependent variable Log price of second homes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Observed treatment × Post 0.259 0.256* 0.252* 
 (0.184) (0.146) (0.146) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
FE and lagged controls No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes 
Observations 323 323 323 
R-squared 0.015 0.562 0.562 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  The two-period analysis is 
structured similarly to the one of Table 2. Data available for all municipalities has been pooled for the pre 
(2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) periods. The average price of second homes in the full sample was about 
597’000CHF pre and 637’000CHF post SHI in not treated municipalities. In those municipalities, the average 
number of transactions was 2.26 (pre) and 1.54 (post). In treated municipalities, the average price was about 
629’000 (pre) and 649’000 (post), with an average number of transaction equal to 7.5 (pre) and 7.38 (post). 
Full summary statistics for all variables (including controls) are available from the authors upon request. 
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FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1 
Voting results at the municipality level with respect to second home percentage 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Voting results at the cantonal level with respect to share of treated population 
 
Note: circles are proportional to the resident population of each canton.  
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FIGURE 3 
Treatment and control groups 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Second home rate distribution at the municipality level 
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FIGURE 5 
Histogram of transacted primary and second homes according to second home percentage 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
FD-IV treatment effects: excluding control municipalities within given distance from treated 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Voting Results and Robustness Checks 
TABLE A1  
Voting results 
Dependent variable Share of no votes 
All Only control Only treated 
Second home rate 0.1225*** -0.0246 0.1961*** 
(0.0270) (0.0454) (0.0596) 
Voting turnout 0.0837** 0.0241 0.2347*** 
(0.0327) (0.0296) (0.0592) 
Average net income 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 0.0012 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Gini coefficient for net income -0.0607 0.1145* -0.1893 
(0.0644) (0.0592) (0.1289) 
Number of primary residents -0.0003*** -0.0004*** 0.0056** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0026) 
Share of foreign residents 0.0206 0.0305 -0.0670 
(0.0291) (0.0250) (0.0715) 
Unproductive surface 0.0335 0.0476* -0.0020 
(0.0266) (0.0281) (0.0311) 
Share of residents in the service sector -0.0070 -0.0010 -0.0061 
(0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0452) 
Share of firms in the service sector -0.0692*** -0.0754*** -0.0985 
(0.0207) (0.0193) (0.0825) 
Homeownership rate 0.0841*** 0.0610*** 0.3199*** 
(0.0173) (0.0154) (0.0687) 
Distance from major CBD -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0012*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Distance from major ski resort -0.0010*** -0.0004*** -0.0032*** 
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Cantonal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,688 1,422 266 
R-squared 0.6297 0.5858 0.6441 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All municipalities for which second 
home rates, voting results, and included control were available in 2010-2011 are included in the sample. 
Municipalities having revised their second home rate are not included.   
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TABLE A2 
FD-IV estimates: Wage regressions 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Employee wages 
Full sample CBD >10 km & Ski>0 km CBD >10 km & [0.15,0.3]  
Observed treatment 0.0124*** 0.0137*** 0.00612 0.00533 0.00610 0.00173 -0.0206 -0.0160 -0.0186 
(0.00380) (0.00380) (0.00419) (0.00646) (0.00625) (0.00665) (0.0174) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 502 502 502 129 129 129 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1623 1619 1553 536.8 524.9 526.2 35.02 38.55 37.92 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.017*** 2.150*** 2.173*** 2.120*** 2.689*** 2.848*** 2.819*** 
(0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0928) (0.0949) (0.0924) (0.454) (0.459) (0.458) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on the first-differenced log-
wages of employees for a given set of controls and for three different samples. The considered samples are the full sample of Tables 2-4, and the restricted samples of Tables 6 and 7, 
respectively. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data into pre (2010-
2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the municipality level by 
computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the SHI. Houses built 
after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using second home rates 
as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000.  
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TABLE A3 
FD-IV estimates: Sorting of permanent residents 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log population 
Full sample CBD >10 km & Ski>0 km CBD >10 km & [0.15,0.3]  
Observed treatment -0.00911 -0.00797 -0.00932 -0.00298 -0.000259 -0.00158 0.0182 0.0265 0.0261 
(0.00654) (0.00650) (0.00669) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0237) (0.0206) (0.0210) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 502 502 502 129 129 129 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1623 1619 1626 536.8 524.9 523.8 35.02 38.55 37.68 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.052*** 2.150*** 2.173*** 2.160*** 2.689*** 2.848*** 2.817*** 
(0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0509) (0.0928) (0.0949) (0.0944) (0.454) (0.459) (0.459) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on the first-differenced log-
population for a given set of controls and for three different samples. The considered samples are the full sample of Tables 2-4, and the restricted samples of Tables 6 and 7, respectively. 
Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data into pre (2010-2011) and post 
(2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the municipality level by computing two-
year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not 
having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using second home rates as measured by the 
Federal Population Census in 2000.  
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TABLE A4 
 FD-IV estimates: Excluding municipalities within 5 km from treated ones (impact of households and investors’ sorting) 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate ∆ Log elderly 
Observed treatment -0.148*** -0.142*** -0.191*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.105*** -0.000813 -0.000846 -0.00581 
(0.0459) (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0248) (0.00840) (0.00841) (0.00851) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,027 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1385 1375 1350 1385 1375 1374 1385 1375 1376 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.130*** 2.128*** 2.079*** 2.130*** 2.128*** 2.126*** 2.130*** 2.128*** 2.120*** 
(0.0572) (0.0574) (0.0566) (0.0572) (0.0574) (0.0573) (0.0572) (0.0574) (0.0572) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable 
for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data 
into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the 
municipality level by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the 
SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using 
second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000. 
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TABLE A5  
FD-IV estimates: Total effect when including residences built after 2012 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes 
Full sample CBD >10 km & Ski>0 km CBD >10 km & [0.15,0.3]  
Observed treatment -0.135*** -0.130*** -0.180*** -0.123* -0.143** -0.188*** -0.514*** -0.328** -0.292* 
(0.0441) (0.0430) (0.0426) (0.0698) (0.0652) (0.0611) (0.176) (0.150) (0.150) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,454 1,454 1,454 525 525 525 134 134 134 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1684 1676 1667 568.2 556.9 548.8 32.12 36.73 36.27 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.041*** 2.043*** 2.019*** 2.142*** 2.168*** 2.142*** 2.558*** 2.739*** 2.772*** 
(0.0497) (0.0499) (0.0494) (0.0898) (0.0919) (0.0914) (0.451) (0.452) (0.460) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on first-differenced log-
prices of primary residences for a given set of controls and for three different samples. The considered samples are the full sample of Tables 2-4, and the restricted samples of Tables 6 and 7, 
respectively. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data into pre (2010-
2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the municipality level by 
computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the SHI. The observed 
treatment dummy is instrumented using second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000.  
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TABLE A6 
FD-IV estimates: Composition effect 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log hedonic prices of primary residences 
 Full sample CBD >10 km & Ski>0 km CBD >10 km & [0.15,0.3]  
Observed treatment -0.0549** -0.0473* -0.0712*** -0.0582 -0.0498 -0.0787 -0.153 0.00341 0.0161 
 (0.0272) (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0638) (0.0647) (0.0629) (0.200) (0.174) (0.173) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,454 1,454 1,454 525 525 525 134 134 134 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1684 1676 1662 568.2 558.6 556.1 32.12 34.64 34.17 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.041*** 2.043*** 2.033*** 2.142*** 2.162*** 2.149*** 2.558*** 2.702*** 2.750*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0499) (0.0498) (0.0898) (0.0915) (0.0907) (0.451) (0.459) (0.457) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on first-differenced (log) 
hedonic prices of primary residences for a given set of controls and for three different samples. The considered samples are the full sample of Tables 2-4, and the restricted samples of Tables 
6 and 7, respectively. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the data into pre 
(2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the municipality level 
by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the SHI. The observed 
treatment dummy is instrumented using second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000. Hedonic prices used as outcome variable pre and post the ban are estimated 
in each period using a predetermined valuation (in the 2008-2009) of age-related characteristics. 
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TABLE A7 
 FD-IV estimates: Placebo tests 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate 
Observed treatment 0.0272 0.0118 -0.0288 -0.0189 -0.0249 -0.0253 
 (0.0346) (0.0319) (0.0313) (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0219) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 1,462 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1840 1869 1818 1840 1869 1867 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.048*** 2.061*** 2.039*** 2.048*** 2.061*** 2.061*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0477) (0.0478) (0.0478) (0.0477) (0.0477) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each 
numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome variable for a given set of controls. The two-
period analysis is carried out by dividing the data into pre (2008-2009) and post (2010-2011) periods. We consider an 
additional pre period (2006-2007) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the municipality level 
by computing two-year averages in these periods. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using second home 
rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000.  
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Appendix B: Theoretical results and model extensions 
Symbolic computations presented in this section have been made using Mathematica. 
Proof of Corollary 1 
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the dynamic equilibrium. We start by explicitly 
stating the equations defining the equilibrium according to Definition 1.   
Labor market clearing: 𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝛾
𝛾
1−𝛽−𝛾?̅?𝑝𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝐴𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾  (B1) 
Primary residents’ spatial equilibrium: 𝑉𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜂 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑎   (B2) 
Investors’ spatial equilibrium: 𝑉𝑡
𝒮 = 𝜃𝑖
𝒮𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝜖 𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑝𝑖𝑡
1−𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑠,𝑏  (B3) 
Primary residences housing market clearing:  
𝑎𝑁𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑟𝑖𝑡
= 𝐻 (
(𝑟−𝑔𝑖)𝑃𝑖𝑡
(𝑟−𝑔𝑖
𝑐)(1+𝑔𝑖
𝑐)
𝑡
 
)
𝜌𝑖
   (B4) 
Secondary residences housing market clearing: 
𝑏𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝒮 = 𝐻
𝒮 (
(𝑟−𝑔𝑖
𝒮)𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝒮
(𝑟−𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐)(1+𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐)
𝑡
 
)
𝜌𝑖
 (B5) 
Tourism services clearing: 𝛽
𝛽
1−𝛽−𝛾𝛾
𝛾
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝛽+𝛾
1−𝛽−𝛾𝐴𝑖𝑡
1
1−𝛽−𝛾𝑊𝑖𝑡
−𝛽
1−𝛽−𝛾 = 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮(1 − 𝑏)
𝑊𝑡
𝒮
𝑝𝑖𝑡
  (B6) 
Using the dynamic price equation 𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑗 =  (𝑟 − 𝑔𝑖
𝑗)𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑗 (1 + 𝑟)⁄ , 𝑗 ∈ {𝒫, 𝒮}, expressing the 
system of equations in changes, and applying a log-transformation we obtain 
ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
) =
1
1−𝛽−𝛾
ln (
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
) +
1
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ln(1 + 𝑔𝐴𝑖) +
𝛾−1
1−𝛽−𝛾
ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
)   (B1’) 
ln (1 + 𝑔𝑉) + 𝑎 ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
) = 𝜂ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) + ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
)   (B2’) 
ln (1 + 𝑔𝑉𝒮) + 𝑏 ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑃𝑖𝑡
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𝑝𝑖𝑡
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𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
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ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
) + ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
) = (𝜌 + 1) ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
) − 𝜌ln (1 + 𝑔𝑐)   (B4’) 
ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) + ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮) = (𝜌 + 1) ln (
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𝒮
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1
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ln (
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
) +
1
1−𝛽−𝛾
ln (1 + 𝑔
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𝛽
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ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
) = ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) + ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮),   (B6’) 
where we have used the notation  
𝑉𝑡+1
𝑉𝑡
= (1 + 𝑔𝑉),
𝑉𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑉𝑡
𝒮 = (1 + 𝑔𝑉𝒮), 
𝐴𝑖𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖𝑡
= (1 + 𝑔
𝐴𝑖
),
𝑊𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑊𝑡
𝒮 =
(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝑆) for the exogenous parameters’ growth. 
As the system is linear in the endogenous quantities ln (
𝑊𝑖𝑡+1
𝑊𝑖𝑡
) , ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝑃𝑖𝑡
) , ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝑁𝑖𝑡
), 
ln (
𝑃𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) , ln (
𝑁𝑖𝑡+1
𝒮
𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝒮 ) , ln (
𝑝𝑖𝑡+1
𝑝𝑖𝑡
) we can solve it with respect to the exogenous 
parameters  ln(1 + 𝑔𝑉) , ln(1 + 𝑔𝑉𝑆), ln(1 + 𝑔𝑊𝒮),  ln(1 + 𝑔𝐴𝑖), ln
(1 + 𝑔𝑖
𝑐), ln(1 + 𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐), 
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𝑎,  𝑏, , 𝜂,  𝜖,  𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾. Assuming parameters do not take degenerate values, the existence and 
uniqueness of the solution follows from standard linear algebra. 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
In the previous section we have shown the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
describing local economies. We make comparative static predictions about the effect of banning 
second homes (i.e. making their housing supply more/perfectly inelastic) by computing the 
derivative of the equilibrium solution with respect to 𝑔𝑖
𝒮,𝑐. In fact, the post-ban costs of 
providing new second homes increased due to the imposed constraints. Table B1 summarizes 
the impact of the ban on the endogenous variables of the system, with 
𝑐: = −1 + 𝜖 + (−1 + 𝑏 + 𝜖)𝜌 − (−1 + 𝑏)𝛾(1 + 𝜌) + (−1 + 𝑏)𝛽(𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌)).  
TABLE B1 
Treatment effects – No agglomeration economies 
Outcome variable Comparative static treatment effect Sign  
Wages −
𝑏𝜌(−𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
Price of primary homes 
𝑏𝜌
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
Number of primary 
residents 
𝑏𝜌(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 ≶ 0 
Price of second homes  −
𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 > 0 
Number of investors 
𝑏𝜌
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
Price of tourism services −
𝑏𝜌((−1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) + 𝛽(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 < 0 
 
The assumptions on our model’s parameters are 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌 > 0 (output elasticities of input factors 
and housing supply are positive), 0 < 𝑎, 𝑏 < 1  (housing consumption of primary residents and 
investors are positive but housing does not consume their entire budget),  𝜂, 𝜖 < 0 (primary 
residents and investors are subject to a disamenity effect caused by the presence of these latter), 
and 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1 (decreasing returns to scale).  
These assumptions determine the sign of the impact of the ban on each outcome variable 
reported in the last column of Table B1 (see the Mathematica code for further details). In 
particular, we have that 𝑐 < 0. This makes it trivial to show that the price of primary homes 
subject to the ban is lower than its counterfactual (point i) of Proposition 1), that wages are 
comparatively lower (point ii) of Proposition 1), and that the number of second home investors 
naturally decreases post-ban. 
It is slightly less trivial to show the sign for the remaining outcome variables. Let us start with 
the price of second homes. We have that 𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾)) = 𝜌(1 − 𝑏)(1 − 𝛽 −
𝛾 − 𝛽𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) − 𝜖𝜌(1 + 𝜌) + 𝜌(1 − 𝑏)𝛽𝑎 > 0, as each term of the sum is positive by 
assumption. The overall price effect is thus positive, which proves Proposition 2.  
52 
 
 
 
The effect of the ban on the number of primary residents is uncertain, as it depends on the 
magnitude of the parameter 𝜂 describing the dislike of primary residents for investors. If 
primary residents strongly dislike investors, the ban may succeed in attracting more new 
primary residents than in the counterfactual case due to the comparative increase in the 
endogenous amenity value of the municipality. On the other hand it’s easy to show that if we 
let 𝜂 → 0 the effect of the ban on the number primary residents is unambiguously negative with 
respect to its counterfactual: while hurting the local economy, the ban provides no incentive for 
them to move into the municipality (point iii) of Proposition 1). The sign of the other 
endogenous variables is the same.  
Finally, let us consider prices of tourism services. We have that −𝑏𝜌((−1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) −
𝛽(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌)) = −𝑏𝜌(−1 + 𝛽 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) − 𝑏𝜌𝛽(−𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜂𝜌) > 0 as each term 
of the sum is positive. The overall price effect on tourism services is thus negative.  
Note that the above comparative static results remain unchanged if we set 𝜖 = 0, i.e. if investors 
are indifferent to each other. This can easily be verified, as i) 𝜖 enters our system of equations 
only through 𝑐, which remains negative for 𝜖 = 0, and ii) every term of the numerator of second 
home prices treatment effect is positive: setting one of them equal to zero does not change the 
sign of the sum.  
Agglomeration economies and reverse effects 
In the previous sections we have assumed that no agglomeration economies were present and, 
in particular, that returns to scale at the aggregate level were decreasing. We now consider the 
case in which agglomeration economies are present, possibly leading to increasing returns to 
scale in the tourism sector. In particular, we investigate how agglomeration forces may reverse 
the predictions of Propositions 1 and 2. Following Glaser and Gottlieb (2009), the most 
straightforward way to introduce agglomeration economies in the model is to modify the 
aggregate production function as follows 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛽
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛾?̅?𝑖
1−𝛽−𝛾
,      0 < 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 < 1, 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1, 
where ?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝛼 denotes an agglomeration term depending on the total number of primary residents 
(workers) in the municipality which increases total factor productivity. Importantly, this factor 
is treated as parametrically given to individual firms. We maintain the hypothesis of decreasing 
returns to scale in absence of agglomeration economies.   
Deriving comparative static results when agglomeration economies are present is easy in our 
context. As the term 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛽
 is replaced by 𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝛼+𝛽
 in the industry first order conditions and noting 
that non-traded capital ?̅? (the only other term involving the output elasticity 𝛽) drops out from 
the system of equations in changes, we can simply substitute 𝛽 with 𝛼 + 𝛽 in equations B1’ and 
B6’. The new dynamic equilibrium is thus equal to the one in the absence of agglomeration 
economies with 𝛽 replaced with 𝛼 + 𝛽. The resulting comparative static results are shown in 
Table B2.  
We now investigate whether the sign of the impact of the ban on primary homes may be reversed 
and the implications for the price of second homes. The starting point is to investigate when the 
sign of the constant 𝑐 is reversed by 𝛼, i.e., when 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾) > 0. One can show 
that  
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𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾) > 0 ⟺  (−1 + 𝑏)𝛼(𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌)) > −𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾). 
Let ?̅? ≔
−𝑐(𝑎,𝑏,𝜖,𝜂,𝜌,𝛽,𝛾)
(−1+𝑏)(𝑎−(1+𝜂)(1+𝜌))
 denote a threshold value of agglomeration economies. This leads 
to the conditions 
𝛼 > ?̅?  if  𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) < 0   (Case 1) 
𝛼 < ?̅?  if  𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) > 0.   (Case 2) 
Case 2 can easily be dismissed, as it implies negative values of 𝛼. In fact, from the previous 
section we know that 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝛾) < 0. If  𝑎 − (1 + 𝜂)(1 + 𝜌) > 0 this would imply a 
negative threshold ?̅?. As the agglomeration parameter 𝛼 is assumed to be positive, we discard Case 
2. This implies that the effect of the ban on the price of primary homes (and on wages, and the 
number of second home investors) is reversed only if the agglomeration economies are strong 
enough. Interestingly, the threshold ?̅? decreases with 𝜂: the more primary residents 
(comparatively) benefit from the ban, the weaker the agglomeration forces must be to create a 
positive effect of the ban on the price of primary homes.    
TABLE B2 
Treatment effects with agglomeration economies 
Outcome variable Comparative static treatment effect 
Wages −
𝑏𝜌(−𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Price of primary homes 
𝑏𝜌
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Number of primary 
residents 
𝑏𝜌(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌)
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Price of second homes −
𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Number of investors 
𝑏𝜌
𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
Price of tourism services −
𝑏𝜌((−1 + 𝛾)(1 + 𝜌) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝜌))
(1 + 𝜌)𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)(1 + 𝑔𝑠,𝑐)
 
 
Let us now consider the effect of the ban on the price of second homes when the effect on the 
price of primary homes is reversed, i.e. when 𝛼 > ?̅?. The sign of the effect is reversed if 
−𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)) < 0. One can show that  
−𝜌(−𝑏 − 𝑐(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜖, 𝜂, 𝜌, 𝛼 + 𝛽, 𝛾)) < 0 ⟺ 𝛼 < −
𝑏+𝑐(𝑎,𝑏,𝜖,𝜂,𝜌,𝛽,𝛾)
(−1+𝑏)(𝑎−(1+𝜂)(1+𝜌))
=: ?̅?′.  
However, as ?̅?′ = ?̅? −
𝑏
(−1+𝑏)(𝑎−(1+𝜂)(1+𝜌))
, we have that ?̅?′ < ?̅?. Therefore, it is not possible 
to reverse the price effect on second homes if it is already reversed for primary ones. In other 
words, in the presence of strong agglomeration economies causing the ban to comparatively 
increase the price of primary homes, the price of second homes must also be comparatively 
higher.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: WEB-APPENDICES 
 
Web-Appendix A: References to Policies on Second Homes  
In this section we provide a small selection of non-academic references on second homes 
policies described in the introduction. The list is by no means exhaustive. Rather, the cited 
references provide a brief description of the implemented policies and how they were welcomed 
by the press.  
TABLE W-A1 
Second homes policies around the world 
Country Reference 
UK 
HM Treasury and George Osborne (2015). Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015, 
Cm 9162. 
Morris, S. (2014). St. Ives council toys with banning outsiders buying holiday homes. 
Guardian, November 17. 
Swerling, G. (2014). St. Ives aims to turn tide on city dwellers with second home ban. The 
Times, November 7. 
The Economist (2016). To the lighthouse. April 2016.  
The Economist (2016). Stay away. May 2016.  
The Guardian (2016). St. Ives backs residents-only home ownership plan in referendum. 
May 2016.  
New York 
Barbanel, J. (2014). New Yourk City Mayor De Blasio Weighs Pied-à-Terre Tax. Wall 
Street Journal, September 23. 
 
Higgins, M. (2013).  Tax-Abatement Changes Affect Many Unit Owners. The New York 
Times, March 26.  
Israel Gross, Judah Ari. (2015). Bid to make housing affordable sends buyers scrambling, but 
will it work? The Times of Israel. June 21.   
Singapore 
Harper, J. (2013). Singapore gets tough on foreign property buyers, The Telegraph, Jan 16.  
Shamim, A. (2011). Singapore Extends Housing Measures; Developers Drop. 
BloombergBusiness, January 14.  
France 
Le Parisien (2014). Résidences secondaires: l’Assemblé a voté la hausse de la taxe 
d’habitation. December 3. 
Samuel, H. (2014). Britons face tax hike on coveted French second homes. Telegraph, 
November 4. 
China 
Bloomberg. (2013). Beijing Curbs Second Home Buying as China Cools Property Market. 
Bloomberg News, 30 March 2013. 
Fung, E. (2015). China Lowers Down Payments for Buyers of Second Homes. Wall Street 
Journal, 30 March. 
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Web-Appendix B: Simulations  
Figure W-B1 provides simulation graphs on the comparative static predictions with and without 
agglomeration economies. Different treatment effects corresponding to several agglomeration 
parameters are represented as a function of the disamenity parameter 𝜂 of primary residents. In 
particular, we show that for 𝛼 above a given value, the effect of the ban is reversed. To this end, 
we calibrate our model as follows: 
𝑎 = 0.3, 𝑏 = 0.15, 𝜌 = 1, 𝛽 = 0.7, 𝛾 = 0.2, g𝑐
𝑆 = 0.01. 
The share of housing consumption for primary residents corresponds to rough rule of thumb 
used by mortgage lenders to finance house purchases. We assume second home investors spend 
half of that share for their secondary residences. To simplify we assume a linear housing supply 
function. The assumed output elasticities’ values are standard in the literature. Growth of 
construction costs of second homes is arbitrarily assumed to increase 1% from one period to 
another. Finally, we assume that investors are less negatively affected by their own presence 
and set 𝜖 = 0.5𝜂. The considered values of the agglomeration parameter 𝛼 are 0 (decreasing 
returns to scale), 0.1 (constant returns to scale), 0.2 (increasing returns to scale but below the 
reverse threshold), 0.5 (increasing returns to scale and above the reverse threshold). 
FIGURE W-B1 
Simulation results – Agglomeration economies and reversed effects 
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The above graphs show how investors’ dislike and returns to scale affect the impact of the ban 
on the endogenous variables of the system. It can be seen that for the considered calibration the 
ban effects are reversed when the agglomeration parameter 𝛼 is above a given threshold (right 
hand side graphs). This threshold is apparently extremely high for the considered calibration – 
for 𝛼 = 0.2 the ban effects remain stable – and it seems plausible to assume that in the real 
world agglomeration forces are not that strong. We thus discuss only left hand side graphs in 
detail.   
In line with Proposition 1, the policy effect is unambiguously negative (resp. positive) for 
primary (resp. secondary) residences and local labor markets. Interestingly, we can see how 
returns to scale of local tourism industries magnify or decrease the effect of the ban on local 
economies depending on its effect on the number of residents. For example, if primary residents 
don’t dislike investors much – and their number is comparatively lower post ban – the wage 
effect of the regulation will be more negative in the case of increasing returns to scale (𝛼 = 0.2) 
than for constant or decreasing ones (𝛼 = 0, 0.1). The opposite is true for the price of tourism 
services. On the other hand, if primary residents strongly dislike investors – and their number 
is comparatively higher after the ban – the negative wage (price of tourism services) effect for 
decreasing returns to scale will be stronger (weaker) than in the case of increasing return to 
scale.  
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Web-Appendix C: Detailed Description of Data and Sources 
The present appendix contains detailed information on the sources and definitions of the data 
used in the paper. Web links to data sources are provided at the end of the section.     
Housing transaction data 
Individual transaction data has been provided by the Swiss Real Estate Datapool Association 
(SRED). The proprietary data can be obtained against payment from the association, see 
reference [1] below. Table W-C1 reports the definition of the variables used in the empirical 
part before being aggregated at the municipality level over given time periods or used to sub-
set the data.    
TABLE W-C1 
Description of housing characteristics and data sources 
Variable name Description Values 
Number of rooms Self-explanatory. To aggregate.  1, 2, 3… 
Number of bathrooms Self-explanatory. To aggregate. 1, 2, 3… 
Number of parking 
places 
Self-explanatory. To aggregate. 1, 2, 3… 
Quality 
The property standard: bad, average, good, very good. 
To aggregate. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Condition 
The property condition: bad, average, good, very good. 
It implicitly describes whether the property needs major 
renovations.  To aggregate. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Micro-location 
The micro-location of the property inside the 
municipality: bad, average, good, very good. It depends, 
for example, whether the property has an open view, is 
situated in a spot with a lot of sun hours, etc. To 
aggregate. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Age 
Age of the property at the moment of the transaction. 
Has been computed by subtracting from the transaction 
year the year in which the property has been built. To 
aggregate. Negative values represent properties having 
been sold before being constructed.  
…,-2, -1, 0, 1, 
2, 3… 
House type House versus flat indicator. To aggregate. 0,1 
Primary 
Primary versus secondary residence indicator. Used to 
subset the data.  
0,1 
Municipality 
FSO identifier for municipalities. More detailed 
information is available at [2]. Used to compute 
geographic distances (see below). 
1, 2, 3… 
Canton 
FSO identifier for cantons. More detailed information is 
available at [5]. Used as categorical variable. 
1, 2, 3…,26 
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Second home rates 
The text of the SHI ordinance, as well as the methodology used to measure municipalities’ 
second home rates are available on the website of the Federal Office for Spatial Development 
(ARE), see [6]. ARE computes second home rates as total housing stock less primary 
residences, which may overestimate the second home number in some municipalities, since not 
all housing units that are not primary homes are necessarily second homes. However, the 
ordinance was applied according to this approximated measure, independently of a 
municipality’s “true” second home rate.  
When the draft of the ordinance – that listed all affected (treated) municipalities – was made 
public in August 2012 – municipalities were allowed to request a revision of their second home 
rate if they could document that the one published by the ARE was incorrect. Municipalities 
that opted to propose a revision of their second home rate did not have to comply with the 
restriction imposed by the initiative. Only about 6% of Swiss municipalities requested a revision 
of their second home rate and all of them were able to provide proof that their second home rate 
was indeed below 20%. ARE continues to systematically verify and update the second home 
rate of all municipalities.  
ARE points out that a comparison of the Federal Population Census of 2000 and the Federal 
Register of Buildings and Dwellings reveals only minor differences between the two data sets, 
in the sense that the classification of municipalities into below and above 20% second homes 
does not vary too much across the two data sets.  
Municipality-level characteristics 
Data on municipality-level characteristics are freely provided by the Federal Statistical Office 
(FSO). The indicators used in the present paper can be directly downloaded using the interactive 
statistical atlas of Switzerland – available only in French and German – see [7]. Table W-C2 
describes the considered variables and the corresponding data sources. When necessary, we 
provide additional information on how data were computed.   
The share of undevelopable land has been computed using land use data measured from 2004 
to 2009. This time interval corresponds to the time necessary to take areal pictures by overflying 
the whole country’s territory. More up-to-date measurements are presently underway and will 
be available in 2018. The FSO classifies municipalities’ surface into four main categories: 
urban, wood, agriculture, and unproductive surfaces. This latter category mainly corresponds 
to lakes, rivers, glaciers, and bedrock surfaces. Additional information on the methodology used 
to measure and classify land surfaces is available at [9].  
Distances to major city centers and ski resorts have been computed using GIS data provided by 
the Federal Office of Topography, see [10]. Geographic boundaries updated to 2014 were used. 
In particular, distances were computed as the minimal planar distance between the two closest 
points of the considered municipalities’ boundaries. For example, if a municipality is adjacent 
to a major urban center/ski resort, the corresponding distance is equal to zero. The 15 major 
urban centers were identified using FSO information on major agglomerations, see [11]. Table 
W-C3 contains a list of the major CBDs we used in our analysis.  
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TABLE W-C2 
Description of municipalities’ characteristics and data sources 
Variable name Description Values 
Vote No  
Share of voters having rejected the SHI on the 11 March 
2012. Provided by the FSO, see [8]. 
[0,1] 
Unproductive surface  
Surface of lakes, mountains, glaciers, etc. present in a 
municipality. Provided by the FSO, see [7]. See below 
for further details. 
[0,1] 
Distance to major city  
Distance to one of the 15 major urban centers of 
Switzerland. See below for further details.  
km 
Distance to major ski 
resort  
Distance to one of the 53 major ski resorts of 
Switzerland. See below for further details. 
km 
Percentage working in 
3rd sector 
Share of firms and individuals working in the third 
sector. Provided by the FSO, see [7] 
[0,1] 
 
The 52 major ski resorts were identified using Google results obtained by searching 
‘Switzerland + ski resorts’, to which we added the municipalities of Ste Croix, St Cergue, and 
Le Lieu to represent ski resorts belonging to the district of Jura-Nord Vaudois. Table W-C4 
contains the list of the considered ski resorts. Some of the considered ski resorts belong to the 
same municipality and thus have the same FSO identification number.  
TABLE W-C3 
Major urban centers (individual municipalities) 
FSO number City Name FSO number City Name 
261 Zürich 230 Winterthur 
6621 Genf 1711 Zug 
2701 Basel 4021 Baden 
351 Bern 371 Biel 
5586 Lausanne 2196 Fribourg 
1061 Luzern 2581 Olten 
3203 St. Gallen 6458 Neuchatel 
5192 Lugano   
 
TABLE W-C4 
Major ski resorts (individual municipalities) 
FSO number City Name FSO number City Name 
1202 Andermatt 3612 Obersaxen 
6031 Verbier 6139 La Tzoumaz 
3851 Davos 3539 Savognin 
5409 Villars-sur-Ollon 6252 Zinal 
584 Mürren 6252 Grimentz 
6300 Zermatt 3982 Disentis 
584 Wengen 1631 Elm 
3575 Laax 1004 Flühli 
6243 Crans-Montana 5411 Les Diablerets 
6290 Saas-Fee 6151 Champéry 
1402 Engelberg 6285 Grächen 
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3787 St. Moritz 5061 Airolo 
3871 Kloster-Serneus 6252 Saint-Luc 
3921 Arosa 6252 Chandolin 
6024 Nendaz 6193 Bürchen 
561 Adelboden 3981 Brigels 
3506 Lenzerheide 6135 Ovronnaz 
576 Grindelwald 1501 Beckenried 
3752 Samnau 794 Zweisimmen 
5407 Leysin 6111 Leukerbad 
3732 Flims 6156 Morgins 
783 Hasliberg 584 Mürren 
3357 Wildhaus 3311 Amden 
3986 Tujetsch 5568 Ste Croix 
792 Lenk im Simmental 5727 St. Cergue 
3762 Scuol 5873 Le Lieu 
6082 Anzère   
 
Fiscal data 
Data on municipalities’ fiscal data are freely available on the website of the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration (FTA), see [12]. Based on individuals liable to pay the Federal Tax, we used the 
average net income and the corresponding Gini index at the municipality level computed 
including both married and not married individuals. We supplemented this data by adding the 
share of foreign residents available at [7].  
Web references 
Reference Link 
[1] http://www.sred.ch/  
[2] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/nomenklaturen/blank/blank/
gem_liste/03.html  
[3] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/nomenklaturen/blank/blank/
gemtyp/01.html  
[4] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/11/geo/raeumliche_typolog
ien/01.html  
[5] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/regionen/thematische_karten/maps/r
aumgliederung/institutionelle_gliederungen.parsys.0002.PhotogalleryDownloadFi
le2.tmp/k00.22s.pdf  
[6] http://www.are.admin.ch/themen/raumplanung/00236/04094/index.html?lang=fr  
[7] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/regionen/thematische_karten/02.html  
[8] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/03/blank/key/2012/011.ht
ml  
[9] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/02/03.html  
[10] https://shop.swisstopo.admin.ch/fr/products/landscape/boundaries3D  
[11] http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/raeumliche_
verteilung/agglomerationen.html  
[12] https://www.estv.admin.ch/estv/de/home/allgemein/dokumentation/zahlen-und-
fakten/steuerstatistiken/direkte-bundessteuer.html  
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Web-Appendix D: Additional Robustness Checks 
TABLE W1 
 FD-IV estimates: Clustered standard errors 
Panel (a): TSLS: Second stage 
Dependent variable ∆ Log price of primary homes ∆ Log unemployment rate ∆ Log elderly 
Observed treatment -0.152*** -0.147*** -0.190*** 0.121*** 0.118*** 0.111*** 0.00246 0.00322 -0.00205 
(0.0549) (0.0518) (0.0633) (0.0336) (0.0334) (0.0325) (0.00584) (0.00609) (0.00607) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,406 
Kleibergen-Paap F 870.2 981 755.7 870.2 981 897.9 870.2 981 980.6 
Panel (b): TSLS: First stage 
Dependent variable Observed treatment 
Second home rates in 2000 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.043*** 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.067*** 2.066*** 2.068*** 2.063*** 
(0.0700) (0.0660) (0.0743) (0.0700) (0.0660) (0.0690) (0.0700) (0.0660) (0.0659) 
Lagged difference of controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Predetermined outcome level No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes: We report standard errors clustered at the cantonal level in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Each numbered column describes the impact of the SHI on a given outcome 
variable for a given set of controls. Municipalities having missing values for a given set of controls are excluded from all specifications. The two-period analysis is carried out by dividing the 
data into pre (2010-2011) and post (2013-2014) approval of the SHI. We consider an additional pre period (2008-2009) to include lagged difference of controls. Data is aggregated at the 
municipality level by computing two-year averages in these periods. The sample includes municipalities for which housing transactions were available pre and post the implementation of the 
SHI. Houses built after 2012, and not having a conversion option anymore, have been excluded from the sample before aggregation. The observed treatment dummy is instrumented using 
second home rates as measured by the Federal Population Census in 2000.  
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